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HOW TO CHOOSE THE LEAST UNCONSTITUTIONAL
OPTION: LESSONS FOR THE PRESIDENT (AND OTHERS)
FROM THE DEBT CEILING STANDOFF
Neil H. Buchanan* & Michael C. Dorf**
The federal statute known as the “debt ceiling” limits total borrowing by the United States. Congress has repeatedly raised the ceiling to
authorize necessary borrowing, but a political standoff in 2011 nearly
made it impossible to borrow funds to meet obligations that Congress had
affirmed earlier that very year. Some commentators urged President
Obama to ignore the debt ceiling, while others responded that such
borrowing would violate the separation of powers and therefore that the
president should refuse to spend appropriated funds.
This Article analyzes the choice the president nearly faced in
summer 2011, and which he or a successor may yet face, as a “trilemma” offering three unconstitutional options: ignore the debt ceiling
and unilaterally issue new bonds, thus usurping Congress’s borrowing
power; unilaterally raise taxes, thus usurping Congress’s taxing power;
or unilaterally cut spending, thus usurping Congress’s spending power.
We argue that the president should choose the “least unconstitutional”
course—here, ignoring the debt ceiling. We argue further, though more
tentatively, that if the bond markets would render such debt inadequate
to close the gap, the president should unilaterally increase taxes rather
than cut spending. We then use the debt ceiling impasse to develop
general criteria for political actors to choose among unconstitutional options. We emphasize three principles derived from a famous speech by
* Professor of Law, The George Washington University Law School, and Senior
Fellow at the Taxation Law and Policy Research Institute, Monash University.
** Robert S. Stevens Professor of Law, Cornell University Law School. The authors
gratefully acknowledge helpful exchanges with and comments from Jack Balkin, Aaron
Bruhl, Josh Chafetz, Kevin Clermont, Sherry Colb, Lonny Hoffman, Mitchel Lasser, Martin
Lederman, Peter Linzer, Michael McConnell, Alan Morrison, Trevor Morrison, Jens
Ohlin, Eduardo Peñalver, Aziz Rana, Neil Siegel, and Laurence Tribe. We also greatly
benefited from the questions and comments of student and faculty participants in
workshops at Cornell Law School, Duke Law School, and the University of Houston Law
School, where we separately presented earlier versions of this Article. Sergio Rudin, Alison
Skaife, and Wanling Su provided excellent research assistance.
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President Lincoln: 1) minimize the unconstitutional assumption of
power; 2) minimize sub-constitutional harm; and 3) preserve, to the extent possible, the ability of other actors to undo or remedy constitutional
violations.
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INTRODUCTION
In the spring of 2011, federal officials announced that, at some point
later in the year, the federal government would be unable to meet all of
its obligations unless the federal debt ceiling was raised. There was no
economic problem. Interest rates on U.S. Treasury bills were close to
zero percent, and the government could readily issue new debt to cover
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its expenses, if only Congress would go through the formal process of
raising the debt ceiling to conform with the budget that it itself had then
only recently approved.1 There was a political problem, however.
Expressing concern about long-term fiscal deficits, Republicans in
Congress—especially those allied with the Tea Party movement—insisted
on a dollar of current spending cuts for every dollar increase in the debt
ceiling.2 Even as Keynesian economists warned of the dangers of premature austerity, Democrats, including President Barack Obama, accepted
the Republican view that deficit reduction was imperative, but they insisted that increased tax revenues had to be part of the formula for
achieving that goal.3 A standoff ensued.
As the day of reckoning approached with no deal in place, some observers advanced a creative solution. Section 4 of the Fourteenth
Amendment, they noted, forbids the questioning of “[t]he validity of the
public debt of the United States,”4 and therefore, they argued, the debt
ceiling is unconstitutional insofar as it forbids the federal government
from honoring its existing financial commitments.5 Accordingly, these
observers contended that in the event that Congress and the President
failed to reach an agreement, the President would be authorized, or
perhaps even constitutionally obligated, to simply ignore the debt ceiling.6 This proposed gambit was quickly dubbed the “nuclear option,”7
and it garnered support from some prominent politicians, including
former President Bill Clinton.8

1. See Department of Defense and Full-Year Continuing Appropriations Act, 2011,
Pub. L. No. 112-10, 125 Stat. 38.
2. See Alan Silverleib & Tom Cohen, Latest Deficit Talks End with a Tense Exchange,
CNN (July 13, 2011), http://articles.cnn.com/2011-07-13/politics/debt.talks_1_debtceiling-short-term-extension-debt-ceiling-hike (on file with the Columbia Law Review)
(outlining evolving brinksmanship between very conservative Republicans and President
in debt ceiling debate).
3. Id.
4. U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 4.
5. See Elspeth Reeve, Is the Debt Ceiling Unconstitutional?, Atlantic Wire (June 29,
2011), http://www.theatlanticwire.com/politics/2011/06/debt-ceiling-unconstitutional/
39408/ (on file with the Columbia Law Review) (summarizing and excerpting legal
reasoning in support of presidential authority to disregard debt ceiling on grounds it is
unconstitutional).
6. Id.
7. E.g., Aaron Blake, Obama Won’t Find Safe Harbor in 14th Amendment, The Fix,
Wash. Post (July 29, 2011, 12:44 PM), http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/the-fix/
post/why-the-14th-amendment-is-not-a-good-option-for-obama/2011/07/29/gIQAynPOhI
_blog.html (on file with the Columbia Law Review).
8. See Joe Conason, Exclusive Bill Clinton Interview: I Would Use Constitutional
Option To Raise Debt Ceiling and “Force the Courts To Stop Me,” Nat’l Memo (June 19,
2011, 4:03 AM), http://www.nationalmemo.com/exclusive-former-president-bill-clintonsays-he-would-use-constitutional-option-raise-debt (on file with the Columbia Law Review)
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The nuclear option had its own problems, however. For one thing, it
could backfire. As a hedge against the possibility that the government
would later default on debt issued by a president acting without congressional authorization, bond purchasers might demand very high rates of
interest for the “radioactive” bonds, thus destabilizing rather than calming financial markets.9 But even if the president’s unilateral authorization of new debt would pacify the markets, it would apparently avoid a
violation of Section 4 of the Fourteenth Amendment only by violating
the separation of powers.10 After all, Article I of the United States
Constitution gives to Congress, not the president, the power “[t]o borrow
11
Money on the credit of the United States.”
Thus, Treasury Secretary Timothy Geithner quickly announced that
12
the Administration would not rely on the Section 4 nuclear option. Perhaps that was simply a ploy to increase pressure on Congress to strike a
deal. If so, it worked, because at the eleventh hour Congress did indeed
pass legislation raising the debt ceiling and punting to a newly created
bipartisan congressional “super-committee” the question of how to
13
achieve the deficit reduction that was also mandated by the legislation.
The super-committee failed to send a legislative proposal to Congress for
consideration, so as this Article goes to press, automatic spending cuts
14
are slated to occur unless Congress enacts superseding legislation.
(comparing former President Clinton’s own budget battle experiences to President
Obama’s and reporting Clinton’s belief that Obama should raise debt ceiling unilaterally).
9. Cf. Bruce Bartlett, The Debt Limit Options President Obama Can Use, Fiscal
Times (Apr. 29, 2011), http://www.thefiscaltimes.com/Columns/2011/04/29/The-DebtLimit-Option-President-Obama-Can-Use.aspx (on file with the Columbia Law Review)
(noting rapid turnover of three-month Treasury bills should quickly resolve these fears
and limit impact of problem).
10. See Laurence H. Tribe, A Ceiling We Can’t Wish Away, N.Y. Times, July 8, 2011,
at A23 [hereinafter Tribe, Ceiling We Can’t Wish Away] (arguing Fourteenth Amendment
does not authorize president to exercise legislative power to prevent constitutional
violations).
11. U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 2; see Tribe, Ceiling We Can’t Wish Away, supra note 10
(describing allocation of borrowing power to Congress).
12. See This Week (ABC television broadcast July 24, 2011), available at
http://abcnews.go.com/Politics/week-transcript-timothy-geithner/story?id=14147682
(transcript on file with the Columbia Law Review) (indicating administration had decided
after careful review that nuclear option was not workable solution); see also Letter from
George W. Madison, Gen. Counsel, Treasury Dep’t, to N.Y. Times (July 8, 2011), available
at http://www.treasury.gov/connect/blog/Pages/Fact-Check-Treasury-General-CounselGeorge-Madison-Responds-to-New-York-Times-Op-Ed-on-14th-Amendment.aspx (on file
with the Columbia Law Review) (explaining Secretary Geithner had “always viewed the debt
limit as a binding legal constraint that can only be raised by Congress”).
13. See Budget Control Act of 2011, Pub. L. No. 112-25, § 401, 125 Stat. 240, 259–63
(establishing Joint Select Committee on Deficit Reduction to recommend legislation that
would reduce deficit by $1.5 trillion by 2021).
14. Id. § 302, 125 Stat. at 256–59. Some members of Congress have indicated that
they wish to repeal the scheduled cuts. E.g., 158 Cong. Rec. H3072 (daily ed. May 17,

2012]

LESSONS OF THE DEBT CEILING STANDOFF

1179

The foregoing events will likely have important political and economic implications, but this Article focuses mostly on the constitutional
questions that were raised in the days and weeks before Congress
reached its crisis-delaying deal in August 2011. With influential members
of Congress—including both the Speaker of the House and the Senate
Minority Leader—having indicated that they intend to use the debt ceil15
ing as leverage in future battles over fiscal policy, a replay of the debt
ceiling standoff remains a very live possibility. Moreover, the summer
2011 crisis raised an important, but mostly unrecognized, issue in constitutional law more generally: What should government officials do when
all of their options are unconstitutional? This Article uses the 2011 debt
ceiling crisis as a case study to begin to explore that question.
Under a plausible description of the options President Obama
would have faced had Congress failed to strike a debt ceiling deal in
August 2011, every realistic option open to him would have violated some
constitutional provision: Failure to pay bondholders, contractors, employees, and other persons entitled to money under federal law would
have violated Section 4 of the Fourteenth Amendment and, in addition,
the President’s obligation to “take Care that the Laws” creating the rele16
vant obligations “be faithfully executed”; issuing new debt without
congressional authorization would have violated the separation of powers; so too would have other unilateral actions to increase government
revenue, such as a presidential decree raising taxes or a presidential sale
17
of government property without congressional authorization; and
simply printing additional dollars and crediting them to the government’s account would have violated the federal statute that limits the
18
amount of money in circulation, along with the power reserved to
19
Congress to coin money and regulate the value thereof, and thus could
have been said to violate the separation of powers and the Take Care
Clause as well.
To be sure, legitimate arguments can be made for the conclusion
that President Obama would have had some constitutional options even
2012) (statement of Rep. Scott Rigell) (“Sequestration is not a rational course correction,
but instead it is a violent, sudden, and severe budget cut, the adverse consequences of
which cannot be overstated.”); 158 Cong. Rec. H2604 (daily ed. May 10, 2012) (statement
of Rep. Howard McKeon) (“I rise today in strong support of [repealing the scheduled
cuts].”).
15. See infra notes 60–61 and accompanying text (discussing statements of Senate
Minority Leader Mitch McConnell and House Speaker John Boehner).
16. U.S. Const. art. II, § 3.
17. See id. art. IV, § 3, cl. 2 (“The Congress shall have Power to dispose of and make
all needful Rules and Regulations respecting the Territory or other Property belonging to
the United States . . . .”).
18. See 31 U.S.C § 5115(b) (2006) (“The amount of United States currency notes
outstanding and in circulation . . . may not be more than $300,000,000 . . . .”).
19. U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 5.
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if Congress had not acted in August 2011. Some commentators argue
that Section 4 of the Fourteenth Amendment only bars a limited category
of defaults—failures to pay bondholders (but not other obligees, for
20
example, Social Security recipients), in one view, or more narrowly still,
21
only failures to pay principal (but not interest) on federal bonds. Other
commentators have advanced exotic solutions, such as Professor Jack
Balkin’s arresting suggestion that the United States could mint two onetrillion-dollar platinum coins, or sell to the Federal Reserve an “exploding option” to purchase government property for two trillion dollars, and
then keep the money (credited to the government’s account by the
22
Federal Reserve) after the option expires (or explodes). We explore
23
these and related exotica below because they help contextualize the
issue, but our analysis suggests that the President’s only realistic options
24
were all unconstitutional. At a minimum, we are willing to assume that
20. See Michael Abramowicz, Beyond Balanced Budgets, Fourteenth Amendment
Style, 33 Tulsa L.J. 561, 580–89 (1997) [hereinafter Abramowicz, Beyond Balanced
Budgets] (arguing “public debt” in Section 4 of Fourteenth Amendment encompasses
only financial obligations stemming from agreements and Social Security is not such a
financial obligation); Michael Abramowicz, Train Wrecks, Budget Deficits, and the
Entitlements Explosion: Exploring the Implications of the Fourteenth Amendment's
Public Debt Clause 43–45 (George Wash. Univ. Law Sch. Pub. Law & Legal Theory Paper
No. 575, 2011) [hereinafter Abramowicz, Train Wrecks], available at http://papers.ssrn.
com/abstract=1874746 (on file with the Columbia Law Review) (same); John Berlau,
Constitutional Nonsense on Debt, Nat’l Rev. Online (July 8, 2011, 12:00 PM),
www.nationalreview.com/articles/271329/constitutional-nonsense-debt-john-berlau (on
file with the Columbia Law Review) (arguing “public debt” does not include government
benefits).
21. Cf. Garrett Epps, Our National Debt “Shall Not Be Questioned,” the Constitution
Says, Atlantic (May 4, 2011, 7:00 AM), http://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2011/
05/our-national-debt-shall-not-be-questioned-the-constitution-says/238269/ (on file with
the Columbia Law Review) (noting perhaps only outright repudiation of obligations, but
not temporary default or delay in payment, is barred); Michael Stern, “Threatening
Default”: A Response to Professor Balkin, Point Ord. (July 1, 2011, 6:04 PM),
http://www.pointoforder.com/2011/07/01/threatening-default-a-response-to-professorbalkin/ (on file with the Columbia Law Review) (arguing only outright repudiation of
public debt violates Section 4 of Fourteenth Amendment).
22. See Jack M. Balkin, 3 Ways Obama Could Bypass Congress, CNN (July 28, 2011),
http://articles.cnn.com/2011-07-28/opinion/balkin.obama.options_1_debt-ceilingcongress-coins [hereinafter Balkin, Ways to Bypass] (on file with the Columbia Law Review).
Because 31 U.S.C. § 5112(k) grants the Secretary of the Treasury the discretion over the
denomination and issuance of platinum bullion coins, it could arguably be used to
circumvent the statutory limit on currency notes.
23. See infra Part III.C.
24. We do not directly consider the proposal of Professors Eric Posner and Adrian
Vermeule, under which the President could simply issue new debt pursuant to his
supposed “paramount duty to ward off serious threats to the constitutional and economic
system.” Eric A. Posner & Adrian Vermeule, Obama Should Raise the Debt Ceiling on His
Own, The Opinion Pages, N.Y. Times (July 22, 2011), http://www.nytimes.com/2011/07/
22/opinion/22posner.html (on file with the Columbia Law Review). Posner and Vermeule
do not attempt to tie this duty to any particular constitutional text. Indeed, in their view,
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that is true. If it turns out not to have been true in 2011, it may well be
true in future crises.
The Article proceeds in four Parts. Part I describes in greater detail
the nature of the options that confronted President Obama in the
summer of 2011. It elaborates on an exchange of views between Professor
Laurence Tribe and one of the current authors, which first appeared in
25
26
essays in The New York Times, the online magazine Verdict, and the
27
eponymous blog of the other of the current authors, to show that the
real issue was not whether the debt ceiling statute violated Section 4 of
the Fourteenth Amendment, but which unconstitutional option the
President ought to have chosen had the day of reckoning arrived.
Part II answers that question. For simplicity, we focus on three options and rank them from worst to least bad. We conclude that the
nuclear option would have been the President’s least bad option. Readers may be surprised at our further conclusion. We tentatively suggest
that a unilateral tax increase by the President comes in second place, less
bad than the option that the President and nearly every other politician
appeared to favor: unilateral spending cuts.
Part III draws general lessons about how the President and other
government officials should choose among unconstitutional options. We
the very effort to constrain authority by law in emergencies is in vain. See Eric A. Posner &
Adrian Vermeule, The Executive Unbound: After the Madisonian Republic 90–93 (2010)
(characterizing actual workings of American administrative law as exemplifying theory of
Carl Schmitt). Although we reach the same conclusion as Posner and Vermeule about the
best course of action for the President, we do not endorse their view that emergencies
provide extralegal justifications. Indeed, our premise is more nearly the opposite: We
argue that even when the president has no lawful options, his decisions are constrained by
law.
25. See Tribe, Ceiling We Can’t Wish Away, supra note 10.
26. See Neil H. Buchanan, The Debt Ceiling Law Is Unconstitutional: A Reply to
Professor Tribe, Verdict (July 11, 2011), http://verdict.justia.com/2011/07/11/the-debtceiling-law-is-unconstitutional (on file with the Columbia Law Review) (disagreeing with
Professor Tribe’s view that debt ceiling’s unconstitutionality would leave President unable
to provide remedy); see also Neil H. Buchanan, The Debt-Limit Crisis: A Problem That
Will Keep Coming Back Unless President Obama Takes a Constitutional Stand Now,
Verdict (July 7, 2011), http://verdict.justia.com/2011/07/07/the-debt-limit-crisis (on file
with the Columbia Law Review) (arguing that debt limit is dangerous policy and that results
of default by federal government would be catastrophic).
27. See, e.g., Laurence Tribe, Professor Tribe Replies to Professor Buchanan
Replying to Professor Tribe Replying to . . . ., Dorf on L. (July 21, 2011, 12:20 AM),
http://www.dorfonlaw.org/2011/07/professor-tribe-replies-to-professor.html (on file with
the Columbia Law Review) (replying to Buchanan and arguing debt ceiling only creates
crisis in combination with other acts of Congress). The Article also builds on some
observations that first appeared in Michael C. Dorf, The Debt Ceiling Crisis Reveals a
Constitutional Gap: How To Choose Among Unconstitutional Options, Verdict (Aug. 1,
2011), http://verdict.justia.com/2011/08/01/the-debt-ceiling-crisis-reveals-a-constitution
al-gap (on file with the Columbia Law Review) (arguing American legal precedents and
tradition provide scant guidance for actors facing choice among unconstitutional
options).
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contend that the task of a government official in choosing among unconstitutional options is to choose the “least unconstitutional” one, rather
than simply to make a policy choice. Policy considerations inevitably
inform the analysis of what counts as least unconstitutional, in part
because the Constitution itself nowhere allows that government officials
may sometimes be required to disobey one or more of its provisions in
order to satisfy one or more other provisions. Nonetheless, the decision
whether to violate one constitutional provision rather than another (or
to violate a single provision in one way rather than another) is not, in our
view, to be decided by an all-things-considered policy judgment. Instead,
as we explain at greater length in Part III, distinctively constitutional policies—such as preservation of the balance of powers among the
branches—should be given extra weight in a calculus that also gives some
weight to sub-constitutional policies. We provide guidelines that build
28
upon President Lincoln’s famous “all the laws, but one” speech. Part III
also explores whether the least unconstitutional option ought, in virtue
of that fact, to be deemed constitutional. We ultimately disapprove of
such post hoc relabeling because it risks obscuring real conflicts among
constitutional requirements and values.
I. THE BUDGET PROCESS, THE DEBT CEILING, AND THE POLITICAL CRISIS
To understand the nature of the choices President Obama nearly
faced in the summer of 2011, and the choices that a future president
could face should the crisis recur, this Part begins by placing the budget
standoff in context. In this Part, we show how the debt ceiling operates in
tandem with a larger web of statutory and constitutional constraints on
presidential action.
A. The Annual Federal Budget
The federal government of the United States is funded on an annual
cycle, with the political branches engaged each year in a process that
plays a large role in determining the levels of spending and tax collection
that the government may undertake.29 Those policy decisions—in combination with other, longer-term policy decisions—determine who receives
various benefits and who bears certain burdens as a result of the various
programs and activities funded and operated by the federal government
and the means by which funds to finance the government are collected.30
28. See infra text accompanying notes 156–163.
29. See generally 31 U.S.C. § 1105 (2006) (detailing requirements for yearly budget
submitted by president).
30. Annual decisions only partly determine spending and taxing levels, because most
spending—so-called “entitlements,” interest on the national debt, and other “mandatory”
spending—as well as most of the tax code is enacted in statutes that remain in force from
year to year. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 401 (a)–(b) (2006) (appropriating funds collected out
of various income taxes to Federal Old-Age and Survivors Insurance Trust Fund as well as
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Taken together, the short-term and long-term policies also shape, to a
very important degree, the level and nature of economic activity at any
given time, as well as the likely path of future economic growth, the
extent of environmental harms and remediation, the provision of education at all levels, and myriad other variables that affect the lives of current
and future citizens.
The budget process is, therefore, political in every sense of the word.
Federal budgetary decisions matter deeply in the day-to-day lives of
people, and they often determine the political fates of members of
Congress and presidents.31 And as the political culture has become less
cooperative over the past few decades, the budgetary process has come
under increasing strain.32 It is thus increasingly likely that we will soon
enter uncharted territory, with budgetary gridlock forcing the president
to take actions that test constitutional limits.
B. The Debt Ceiling’s Purported Limitation on Borrowing
The annual federal budget authorizes government agencies to carry
out functions that require the expenditure of funds.33 When a budget is
passed, the Treasury Department is authorized to issue funds under the
federal government’s array of programs and contracts.34 The budget
must include both the authority to undertake specific activities (to build
bridges, to pay medical benefits, and so on) and the appropriation of
money to spend on those activities.35 The final appropriations bills thus
provide the legal authority to take money that is in the federal government’s possession and spend it on authorized programs.
The money in the government’s possession at any moment includes
revenues collected from taxation and other sources (such as various

Federal Disability Insurance Trust Fund); see also Josh Chafetz, Congress’s Constitution,
160 U. Pa. L. Rev. 715, 729 (2012) (noting in 2010 fiscal year, sixty-one percent of federal
spending was mandatory spending, and percentage has been increasing over time). Of
course, Congress could exert more annual control over spending by replacing entitlement
formulae with annual appropriations. See id. (characterizing entitlement provisions as
“ced[ing] the institutional advantage of annual appropriations” to president).
31. See Allen Schick, The Federal Budget: Politics, Policy, Process 3 (3d ed. 2007)
(“In national politics, it is now the age of budgeting.”).
32. Id. at 2–4, 108–10 (noting increased political gridlock as federal budget grew).
33. Generally, federal agencies cannot use funds until they have been appropriated,
via the yearly budget or some other statutory authorization. See 31 U.S.C. § 1347 (“An
agency in existence for more than one year may not use amounts otherwise available for
obligation to pay its expenses without a specific appropriation or specific authorization by
law.”).
34. See id. § 321(a)(3) (“The Secretary of the Treasury shall . . . issue warrants for
money drawn on the Treasury consistent with appropriations . . . .”).
35. Id. § 1105(a)(12)–(22).
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fees).36 If the money available at any given moment is inadequate to fund
the appropriated programs, the law authorizes the Treasury to borrow
funds sufficient to cover the shortfall.37 If the current levels of appropriated spending fall short of annual revenues (that is, if the government
runs a surplus), the remaining funds are used to repay previously issued
debt obligations as those debt obligations come due.38
Therefore, together with mandatory spending,39 each year’s budget
process implies a change in the overall level of outstanding federal
debt.40 If appropriated spending exceeds authorized taxes, the Treasury
is instructed to borrow more money, under Congress’s Article I power to
borrow money on the credit of the United States.41 This instruction includes borrowing any funds necessary to repay the principal and interest
on the debt obligations from previous years that have come due, allowing
the aggregate level of debt to rise even while the federal government
honors its contractual commitments to its creditors.42
The annual change in the aggregate level of the federal government’s debt, therefore, is necessarily determined by the difference
between spending and tax revenues authorized in the budget.43 If, for
example, the total debt is ten trillion dollars at the beginning of the fiscal
year, and spending appropriations exceed tax revenues by one trillion
dollars during the fiscal year, then the debt will go up to eleven trillion
dollars (putting aside daily compounding of interest and similar factors).
The budget itself both determines the necessary change in aggregate
borrowing and authorizes any new borrowing that is required to carry
out the will of Congress, as expressed in its duly enacted budget.
36. See id. § 3302(b) (requiring deposit of all public funds into Treasury); id. § 3720
(requiring money collected by other agencies to be deposited with Treasury). For an
example of the various fees collected by the Treasury, see the Freedom of Information Act
(FOIA) fee schedule detailed by 31 C.F.R. § 1.7 (2012) (outlining four categories of FOIA
requesters and defining fees and fee waiver provisions).
37. See, e.g., 31 U.S.C. § 3104(a) (“The Secretary of the Treasury may borrow on the
credit of the United States Government amounts necessary for expenditures authorized by
law . . . .”); id. § 3102(a) (allowing Treasury Secretary to issue bonds); id. § 3103(a)
(allowing Treasury Secretary to issue notes).
38. Net repayment of debt last occurred during the late Clinton administration, as
the public debt shrank from $3,772.3 billion in 1997 to $3,319.6 billion in 2001. Cong.
Budget Office, The Budget and Economic Outlook: Fiscal Years 2010 to 2020, at 126
(2010), available at http://www.cbo.gov/doc.cfm?index=10871&type=1 (on file with the
Columbia Law Review).
39. See supra note 30.
40. Reflecting this reality, every federal budget must include an up-to-date report to
Congress on the level of federal debt. 31 U.S.C. § 1105(a)(10), (36).
41. See supra note 37.
42. See 31 U.S.C. § 3111 (allowing Treasury to issue new obligations in order to
redeem or refund outstanding bonds, notes, bills, and certificates).
43. See, e.g., Jacqueline Murray Brux, Economic Issues and Policy 393 (5th ed. 2010)
(defining “national debt”).
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Accordingly, there has always been an unofficial “debt ceiling.” That
is, when Congress and the president determine the levels of spending
and revenues, they also necessarily determine the path of the national
debt. The debt will be as high as Congress permits, and no higher. Various agencies of the federal government issue estimates of how any
budget will change the aggregate level of debt, providing that information to Congress, the president, and the public as part of the negotiations over each year’s budget choices.44 Subject to unexpected changes in
the economic conditions that can alter tax revenues or require different
levels of expenditures,45 the passage of a new budget is necessarily a statement that the government is planning to owe a certain amount of money
at any given time.
Even though the budget process itself is both necessary and sufficient to empower Congress to limit the government’s debt, the total level
of debt has become a politically salient (albeit highly inaccurate)
measure of the government’s “fiscal responsibility.”46 As the national debt
level has risen over time, politicians and the public have expressed
concern that this trend might harm the economy, now or in the future.47
This concern is often manifested in claims that the debt level is impoverishing “our children and grandchildren,”48 who will purportedly bear the

44. See 31 U.S.C. § 1105(a)(21)(B) (requiring president to submit to Congress
budget showing “specific aspects of the program of, and appropriations for, each agency”);
id. § 1105(a)(21)(C) (requiring this budget to include estimated goals and financial
requirements). For an example of such a published estimate, see Office of Mgmt. &
Budget, Analytical Perspectives: Fiscal Year 2012 Budget of the U.S. Government 115–18
(2012) [hereinafter OMB, Analytical Perspectives], available at http://www.whitehouse
.gov/sites/default/files/omb/budget/fy2012/assets/spec.pdf (on file with the Columbia
Law Review).
45. See, e.g., OMB, Analytical Perspectives, supra note 44, at 119 (“During the budget
execution phase, the Government sometimes finds that it needs more funding than the
Congress has appropriated for the fiscal year because of unanticipated circumstances.”).
46. See, e.g., 157 Cong. Rec. H5854–55 (daily ed. Aug. 1, 2011) (statement of Rep.
Tom Reed) (“Mr. Speaker, $14.4 trillion; $1.6 trillion every year added onto that national
debt. The people in November, 2010, spoke loudly . . . . They want us to get our fiscal
house in order.”); 157 Cong. Rec. H5678 (daily ed. July 28, 2011) (statement of Rep. Jerry
McNerney) (“Democrats and Republicans agree that raising the Federal debt is
unsustainable, that the default is absolutely unacceptable, and that we must set our
country on a course of fiscal responsibility.”).
47. See, e.g., Pew Research Ctr. for the People & the Press, Frustration with Congress
Could Hurt Republican Incumbents 17 (2011), available at http://www.people-press.org/
files/legacy-pdf/12-15-11%20Congress%20and%20Economy%20release.pdf (on file with
the Columbia Law Review) (finding seventy-six percent of respondents believe debt is
“major threat” to national economy).
48. See, e.g., 175 Cong. Rec. H7637 (daily ed. Nov. 16, 2011) (statement of Rep.
Michael McCaul) (“Our debt burden in this country is so heavy, it is no longer simply a
financial issue; it is a moral issue. We have spent and spent, racking up astronomical debt
that will dampen the American Dream for our children and grandchildren.”).
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burdens of the nation’s debt yet receive none of the benefits of the
activities that gave rise to the debt.49
In the face of concerns that the debt might be rising in an uncontrolled fashion—even though, as noted, Congress maintains complete
control over the level and path of federal debt—Congress began in the
early twentieth century to impose a purported limit on total federal debt.
Originally enacted in 1917,50 and imposed in its current form beginning
in 1939,51 the debt ceiling law imposes an upper limit on the face amount
of debt that the U.S. government can owe at any time.52
This limit is, however, calculated in a peculiar fashion. It includes in
the total measure of the debt owed by the federal government the value
of loans that the federal government has made to itself.53 That is, when
the government’s internal accounts treat interagency obligations as
“government borrowing” (without noting that the government is also
lending the money), then that accounting convention increases the debt
of the United States, as defined by the debt ceiling statute.54 Moreover,
with the economy growing over time, the government’s ability to finance
its obligations improves as well. The debt ceiling, however, is denomi49. This is a grossly inaccurate view of the underlying reality, in no small part because
money borrowed today may be put to productive use that will benefit those very children
and grandchildren. For example, the government may purchase land they can use for
recreation or pay teachers to educate them. But this is not the place for us to argue against
the view that the government faces a long-term fiscal crisis or to suggest that even if such a
crisis looms, efforts to redress it should be delayed until a period of sustained economic
growth. For further discussion of these issues, see generally Neil H. Buchanan, Good
Deficits: Protecting the Public Interest from Deficit Hysteria, 31 Va. Tax Rev. 75 (2011)
(arguing many deficit fears are unfounded and proposing establishment of independent
agency to identify spending projects that warrant debt financing); Neil H. Buchanan,
What Do We Owe Future Generations?, 77 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 1237 (2009) (arguing that
likely higher living standards of future generations undercut claim that current public
debt unfairly disadvantages such future generations). The salient point here is that the
widespread perception of the need for deficit reduction has been lately driving federal
budgetary priorities.
50. Second Liberty Bond Act of 1917, Pub. L. No. 65-43, 40 Stat. 288.
51. Amendment to Second Liberty Bond Act, Pub. L. No. 76-201, 53 Stat. 1071
(1939); see also D. Andrew Austin & Mindy R. Levit, Cong. Research Serv., RL 31967, The
Debt Limit: History and Recent Increases 3 (2011) (describing history of debt ceiling,
including 1939 changes that created aggregate ceiling of all government debt).
52. 31 U.S.C. § 3101 (2006).
53. See Schick, supra note 31, at 124.
54. This is not an insignificant sum. At the end of fiscal year 2011, gross federal debt
was approximately $14.8 trillion, while the debt actually held by the public (which includes
all lenders, foreign and domestic, as well as the Federal Reserve System, but not
interagency debt within the federal government) was approximately $8.5 trillion. U.S.
Federal Debt by Year, USGovernmentSpending.com (Aug. 3, 2012), http://www.us
governmentspending.com/federal_debt (on file with the Columbia Law Review). The
difference—more than one-third of gross debt—was mostly the internal obligations in the
Social Security Trust Funds. See Dep’t of the Treasury Fin. Mgmt. Serv., Treasury Bull.,
June 2012, at 21 tbl.FD-1 (detailing debt totals and holders for fiscal year 2011).
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nated in dollars, rather than as a percentage of national income,55 which
effectively lowers the debt ceiling over time, unless Congress acts to
increase it.56
As history has unfolded in the years since the debt ceiling statute was
first enacted, Congress has generally acted to increase the debt ceiling as
necessary, in line with the new accumulated borrowing needs implied by
annual budgets.57 Prior to 2011, there were brief political standoffs over
proposed increases in the debt ceiling, with Congresses under the control of one political party using the debt ceiling vote to try to extract
concessions from a president of the opposite party—or simply using the
debt ceiling vote58 as a moment to make speeches about fiscal responsibility.59 While these standoffs have arisen occasionally over the decades,
the mid-2011 political crisis was the first time that it appeared that
Congress might simply refuse to increase the debt ceiling, even though
its own budget required more borrowing to fund its required spending
levels, given its decisions about tax revenues and other laws on the books.
Although that crisis was ultimately defused, the Minority Leader in
the United States Senate subsequently announced that the debt ceiling
would henceforth become a weapon in budget negotiations.60 The
Speaker of the House endorsed continued debt-ceiling brinksmanship in

55. See 31 U.S.C. § 3101(b) (“The face amount of obligations issued under this
chapter and the face amount of obligations whose principal and interest are guaranteed
by the United States Government (except guaranteed obligations held by the Secretary of
the Treasury), may not be more than $14,294,000,000,000, outstanding at one time . . . .”).
56. To be clear, even denominating a debt limit in percentage-of-GDP terms could
have perverse consequences, under certain circumstances. During a recession, for
example, GDP falls (by definition). If the debt were limited to a fixed percentage of GDP,
the debt limit statute would affirmatively require the president to decrease spending or
raise taxes in the teeth of the recession. This would mean that a percentage-of-GDP limit
could force decisions that would actively reinforce the negative trend of the economy.
Although we do not endorse a debt limit statute in any form, we do note that expressing a
debt limit as a percentage of the economy’s potential GDP would avoid this problem,
because potential GDP generally is invariant to short-term recessionary fluctuations in the
economy.
57. See Austin & Levit, supra note 51, at 15 tbl.2 (listing increases in debt limit since
1993).
58. See id. at 12–15 (discussing process of raising debt ceiling from 2008 to 2010).
59. See, e.g., 148 Cong. Rec. 8718 (2002) (statement of Rep. Jim Turner) (“The
statutory debt ceiling is a law that provides the maximum amount that our Federal
Government can go into debt. It is one of the few tools that we have to promote fiscal
responsibility and require fiscal discipline in this House.”).
60. See 157 Cong. Rec. S5219 (daily ed. Aug. 2, 2011) (statement of Sen. Mitch
McConnell) (“[N]ever again will any President, from either party, be allowed to raise the
debt ceiling . . . without having to engage in the kind of debate we have just come
through.”).

1188

COLUMBIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 112:1175

May 2012.61 No longer will disagreements over spending, taxes, and
borrowing be worked out only through the budget process itself, with
Congress then agreeing to raise the debt ceiling to comport with the projected increase in debt that its own decisions require. Congress (or,
under certain circumstances, a blocking minority of the Senate) might in
the future refuse to increase the debt limit, engaging in political brinksmanship to extract concessions on policy from the other party’s leadership. Such maneuvers differ from the brinksmanship in normal budget
negotiations, where members of Congress can block the government
from agreeing to future obligations, because a refusal to increase the debt
ceiling makes it impossible for the government to honor its current
obligations, to which it committed when it passed its budget.
Furthermore, although the most recent debt ceiling standoff was
focused on federal spending itself—with newly authorized increases in
borrowing tied to future decreases in spending by the federal government62—there is nothing to prevent the debt ceiling from being held
hostage to non-budgetary demands. A sufficiently motivated bloc in
Congress could require changes in various social policies, or national
security policies, or any other politically contentious area of the law,
before agreeing to increase the debt ceiling. Such tactics could force the
government to choose between violating its own commitments and making changes in policies that are unrelated to those existing commitments.
With the emergence of this apparently real threat—that Congress
might one day soon refuse to back up its budgetary commitments with
sufficient borrowing authority—it is now possible to imagine a situation
in which Congress and the president will reach a fatal impasse, failing to
agree to increase the debt ceiling when obligations come due. This
would, for the first time, put the United States government in the position of being politically and legally unable to pay what it has promised to
pay—even when there is no economic barrier to doing so.
C. The Applicability or Irrelevance of Section 4 of the Fourteenth Amendment
If we reach such an impasse, it will become impossible for the president to honor his responsibilities under the Constitution to faithfully
execute the laws of the United States. One way to view the problem,
should such a crisis arise, is to say that the existence of the debt ceiling
law itself creates the impasse, where none need exist. Without the debt
61. See Jonathan Weisman, Republicans Pledge New Standoff on Debt Limit, N.Y.
Times, May 16, 2012, at A1 (reporting House Speaker John A. Boehner’s vow “to hold up
another increase in the federal debt ceiling unless it was offset by larger spending cuts”).
62. See Budget Control Act of 2011, Pub. L. No. 112-25, § 302(a), 125 Stat. 240, 256–
57 (covering deficit reduction); Alan Silverleib & Tom Cohen, White House,
Congressional Leaders Reach Debt Deal, CNN (July 31, 2011), http://articles.cnn.com/
2011-07-31/politics/debt.talks_1_debt-ceiling-debt-deal-deficit-reduction (on file with the
Columbia Law Review) (summarizing terms of debt ceiling deal).
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ceiling, after all, the president could simply collect the revenues implied
by the tax law, expend the funds implied by the appropriations laws, and
borrow any necessary additional funds as authorized by Congress.63
In this vein, some commentary emerged during the summer of 2011,
suggesting not only that the debt ceiling statute is an unnecessary (and
needlessly dangerous) law, but that its existence might violate the
Constitution.64 Section 4 of the Fourteenth Amendment states, in
pertinent part, “[t]he validity of the public debt of the United States,
authorized by law . . . shall not be questioned.”65 Under one plausible
reading of that provision, the debt ceiling statute—because it raises the
possibility that the United States will fail to meet some of its legal obligations to pay money, as promised under the law—will bring the validity of
the debt of the United States into question. If that is true, then the constitutional provision invalidates the statutory enactment, and the debt
ceiling statute must be deemed invalid. The president would then ignore
the debt ceiling and order the Treasury Department to issue debt otherwise authorized by Congress. This reading of the Constitution, as noted
in the Introduction above, has become known as “the nuclear option.”66
Although this interpretation is not the only plausible reading of
Section 4, and although (as we discuss below) it is ultimately only one
way to conclude that the debt ceiling must be set aside, there is much to
be said for it. The difficulty is in defining the word “questioned” in a limited and meaningful way. The only guidance on this question from the
Supreme Court was issued during the Great Depression, in Perry v. United
States.67 Perry was a challenge to a federal law that purported to supersede
federal bond provisions entitling the bondholders to be paid principal
and interest in gold.68 Although the Court found that Perry was not
entitled to the particular relief he sought, en route to that holding, Chief
Justice Hughes declared that Congress was constitutionally forbidden
63. See supra notes 36–37 and accompanying text.
64. See, e.g., 157 Cong. Rec. H5295–96 (daily ed. July 21, 2011) (statement of Rep.
Sheila Jackson Lee) (questioning constitutionality of debt limit); Jonathan H. Adler, Is the
Debt Limit Constitutional—Part Deux, Volokh Conspiracy (July 3, 2011, 1:09 PM),
http://volokh.com/2011/07/03/is-the-debt-limit-constitutional-part-deux/ (on file with
the Columbia Law Review) (summarizing academic debate around constitutionality of debt
ceiling); Jack Balkin, The Legislative History of Section Four of the Fourteenth
Amendment, Balkinization (June 30, 2011, 1:59 PM), http://balkin.blogspot.com/2011/
06/legislative-history-of-section-four-of.html [hereinafter Balkin, Section Four] (on file
with the Columbia Law Review); Garrett Epps, The Speech Obama Could Give: “The
Constitution Forbids Default,” Atlantic (Apr. 28, 2011, 3:56 PM), http://www.theatlantic
.com/politics/archive/2011/04/the-speech-obama-could-give-the-constitution-forbidsdefault/237977/ (on file with the Columbia Law Review) (suggesting federal default would
be unconstitutional).
65. U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 4.
66. See supra notes 5--7 and accompanying text.
67. 294 U.S. 330 (1935).
68. Id. at 346–47.
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from retroactively altering the terms of its debt instruments.69 The Chief
Justice placed some reliance on Section 4 of the Fourteenth
Amendment. He wrote,
We regard [Section 4] as confirmatory of a fundamental principle, which applies as well to the government bonds in
question, and to others duly authorized by the Congress, as to
those issued before the Amendment was adopted. Nor can we
perceive any reason for not considering the expression “the
validity of the public debt” as embracing whatever concerns the
integrity of the public obligations.70
This language from Perry offers a broad reading of Section 4 that
suggests that the validity of the debt of the United States is brought into
question whenever the government acts, or threatens to act, in a way that
suggests that it will not honor all of its obligations. This statement recognizes the possibility (indeed, the likelihood) that holders of federal
debt—that is, the people who have loaned money to the United States—
will have reason to seriously question whether the United States will
repay the money that it borrowed if they see that the federal government
has failed to live up to its other obligations. Even if the government is
currently paying all interest and principal on existing government debts,
current and potential lenders will have reason to question the validity of
the debt if, for example, they observe the federal government refusing to
pay promised Social Security benefits or refusing to reimburse a vendor
for services rendered to the Defense Department.
Under this view, then, the debt ceiling is constitutionally infirm, at
least as applied during a politically manufactured standoff, because its
existence causes the public reasonably to question whether the federal
government will soon choose not to honor its debt commitments. A
court that strikes down the debt ceiling statute or a president who
ignores it, under this reading, can guarantee that the commitments
made by the government in its duly enacted annual budget will be met.
Although we have considerable sympathy for the “nuclear option,”
we recognize that the reading of Section 4 that underlies it is debatable.
The quoted language from Perry, though appearing in the controlling
opinion of the case, was not endorsed by a majority of the Justices of the
Court.71 It is, therefore, arguably dicta. While we are persuaded that the
quoted language is correct on the merits—that is, that it is dangerously
shortsighted not to suspect that any defaulted obligation will bring into

69. Id. at 351–52.
70. Id. at 354.
71. The case was decided by a 5-4 vote. Although Justice Stone nominally concurred,
rather than concurring only in the judgment, he wrote separately to indicate that he did
not endorse the portion of the majority opinion in which the discussion of Section 4 of the
Fourteenth Amendment appeared. See id. at 359 (Stone, J., concurring).
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question the validity of the public debt—the Supreme Court has not
definitively endorsed that view in a legally binding fashion.
In addition, it is plausible to argue that Section 4 should be interpreted narrowly, especially in light of the circumstances surrounding its
enactment in the aftermath of the Civil War.72 Read in that context,
Section 4 chiefly targets the worry that, once fully readmitted to the
Union, senators and representatives from Southern states (not to mention President Andrew Johnson) would deliberately refuse to repay debts
incurred in suppressing the Confederate rebellion.73 One might concede
that Section 4’s literal language does not limit the provision’s application
to Civil War debts but nonetheless take a narrow view of what constitutes
“questioning” or “public debt” by, for example, treating government
failure to pay vendors for services rendered or entitlement beneficiaries
their statutory benefits as outside the scope of the Amendment.74 Under
an extremely narrow view, even worried bondholders would not be said
to “question” the validity of the debt within the meaning of the
Fourteenth Amendment unless they were told directly that the govern-

72. See Abramowicz, Beyond Balanced Budgets, supra note 20, at 581 n.94 (noting
narrowest possible construction of Section 4 would limit it to Civil War debt only).
73. See id. at 582–87 (considering but rejecting this narrow interpretation of Section
4); Balkin, Section Four, supra note 64 (“[T]he goal [of Section 4] was to remove threats
of default of federal debt from partisan struggle.”).
74. See Abramowicz, Beyond Balanced Budgets, supra note 20, at 582–87 (suggesting
general applicability of Section 4 to non-Civil War debts). Careful readers of this Article
and our prior, popular writings on the debt ceiling crisis will note that our position on the
meaning of Section 4 of the Fourteenth Amendment has evolved somewhat. We attribute
that evolution in significant part to our enlightening exchange with Professor Tribe.
Nonetheless, we continue to think that there is more to the broad reading advanced in
Perry than Professor Tribe’s writings suggest. For example, Professor Tribe wrote that
Flemming v. Nestor, 363 U.S. 603 (1960), supports the conclusion that Section 4 does not
protect Social Security recipients against having their benefits reduced. Laurence H.
Tribe, Guest Post on the Debt Ceiling by Laurence Tribe, Dorf on L. (July 16, 2011, 5:33
PM),
http://www.dorfonlaw.org/2011/07/guest-post-on-debt-ceiling-by-laurence.html
[hereinafter Tribe, Debt Ceiling] (on file with the Columbia Law Review). That is a fair
point, but a limited one, for at least three reasons. First, Flemming itself distinguished
between mere benefits and contractual obligations, 363 U.S. at 610, and could therefore
be read to provide support for more than the minimal meaning of Section 4 as applicable
only to bonds. Second, the contract/benefit distinction drawn in the 5-4 ruling in Flemming
may have been at least partly undermined by the later ruling in Mathews v. Eldridge, which
treated Social Security benefits as protected property interests for procedural due process
purposes. 424 U.S. 319, 332 (1976). Although procedural due process does not invariably
protect against legislative abolition of the underlying property interest, the erosion of the
contract/benefit distinction in the procedural context could have implications for its
continued vitality in other contexts. Hence, even in a case like Flemming, Social Security
benefits might now fall on the protected side of the line. Third, taken on its terms,
Flemming did not decide any issue under Section 4 of the Fourteenth Amendment, of
which Perry remains the case that comes closest to providing an authoritative construction.
Although Professor Tribe avers that the Constitution does not use “debt” synonymously
with “obligations,” the Perry Court did. See supra text accompanying note 70.
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ment had decided not to pay the principal and interest promised under
the terms of its debt instruments (which are legally binding contracts).75
Yet still narrower readings are available. Consider the question of
whether the “debt” owed to bondholders means the principal alone, or
the principal plus the interest. The interest payments, after all, only
become part of the national debt when they are paid, and only if they are
paid by borrowing money from other lenders. In that way, interest
payments on the debt are no different from veterans’ benefits, or the
salaries of FBI agents.76 None are currently owed by the federal government, yet all are promised to be paid in the future under contracts
entered into by the federal government.
Even the deceptively simple move of stretching the definition of
“questioned” sufficiently to sweep interest payments into Section 4 is,
therefore, a nontrivial interpretive exercise. We must either allow the
Perry language to have some force, or we absurdly reduce the meaning of
Section 4 to the point where even holders of government debt can be the
victims of contractual breach without ever questioning the validity of the
debt. This reductio suggests that the Perry language—which gives Section
4 something like its natural everyday meaning—is most plausible, and
that the narrower readings are inappropriately cramped.
Nevertheless, there remains the opposite danger of reading the constitutional provision too broadly. Even if the word “questioned” should
not be interpreted as narrowly as described above, one can reasonably
worry that the word’s meaning might be inappropriately expanded to
include nearly anything that might make people think twice about the
federal government’s creditworthiness. Surely it would go too far to find
a violation of the Fourteenth Amendment in any situation in which
Congress seems to be unable to act responsibly. After all, an embarrassing public spectacle on the floor of Congress might make people question whether the federal government is run by fools, and thus lead them
to question whether the government will be forced to default on its debt
at some future time. But it is unreasonable to say that every embarrassing
moment on the congressional floor actually violates Section 4 of the
Fourteenth Amendment.77
75. See Abramowicz, Train Wrecks, supra note 20, at 23 (noting under one
interpretation of Section 4 validity of public debt is only questioned upon nonpayment);
Stern, supra note 21 (arguing more than possible default is required before “validity of
public debt” is questioned).
76. Cf. Abramowicz, Train Wrecks, supra note 20, at 43–45 (arguing that reading
Public Debt Clause to protect entitlements may “begin[] to stretch the Clause’s
meaning”).
77. It would be even more unreasonable to argue that private actors could be said to
violate Section 4 by questioning the government’s ability to repay its debts, even though
the literal language of Section 4 uses the passive voice in a way that could be interpreted to
apply to anybody who questions the validity of the public debt, such as a newspaper
columnist who writes that the government might default. Our conclusion on this point is
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Even under a less expansive reading of Section 4, however, there are
still arguments that are simply wrong. For example, economic libertarians might argue that the issuance of debt itself could be seen to violate
Section 4, because to issue debt is to raise the possibility that it will not be
repaid. The practical import of that argument is that any increases in public debt (that is, new borrowing to cover new deficits) bring into question
the validity of the public debt by making it possible that the government
will not be able to repay the debt.78 This argument suggests that, even in
the absence of the debt ceiling, it is possible for the federal government
to issue so much debt that it will someday be forced to default.79
This reasoning is flawed, for a very simple reason. All current United
States debt is denominated in dollars, which the federal government
alone is empowered to create.80 Therefore, when the federal government
issues new debt, lenders know that they will be repaid with dollars, and
that the entity to which they loaned money can create those dollars as its
own means of repayment.81 That is why, until the summer of 2011, financial markets treated United States debt securities as the equivalent of
cash.82 When a security denominated in dollars is backed by the full faith
and credit of the United States, there should be no risk of default.83
not driven strictly by the constitutional text, however. After all, the only other provision of
the Constitution that uses the locution “shall not be questioned” is the Speech or Debate
Clause of Article I, Section 6, and that provision has been held to shield senators and
representatives against private civil actions. See Eastland v. U.S. Servicemen’s Fund, 421
U.S. 491, 502–03 (1975) (“[T]he Clause provides protection against civil as well as
criminal actions, and against actions brought by private individuals . . . .”). By extension,
the same locution in Section 4 of the Fourteenth Amendment could also be read to
protect the validity of the public debt even against private questioning. Nonetheless, such
a reading, which would work a partial sub silentio repeal of the First Amendment, strikes
us as beyond the realm of plausibility.
78. See Ron Paul, Default Now, or Suffer a More Expensive Crisis Later, Bloomberg
(July 22, 2011, 1:00 PM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2011-07-22/default-now-orsuffer-a-more-expensive-crisis-later-ron-paul.html (on file with the Columbia Law Review)
(arguing government has already exceeded its capability ever to repay its debt).
79. See id. (“Unless major changes are made today, the U.S. will default on its debt
sooner or later . . . .”).
80. See 31 U.S.C. § 5118(c)(3) (2006). The Gold Reserve Act of 1934 forbade
issuance of U.S. government obligations repayable in gold, although foreign central banks
were still able to exchange dollars held for gold. Pub. L. No. 73-87, 48 Stat. 337. The
Nixon Administration ended the latter practice in 1971. See David M. Andrews,
International Monetary Power 25 (2006). By contrast, the bonds at issue in Perry were
payable in gold. 294 U.S. 330, 347 (1935).
81. 31 U.S.C. § 5114 (authorizing Treasury to print money). Additional power to
expand the money supply rests with the Federal Reserve System. See Fed. Reserve Sys.,
Purposes & Functions 16–18 (9th ed. 2005) [hereinafter Fed. Reserve Sys., Purposes],
available at http://www.federalreserve.gov/pf/pdf/pf_complete.pdf (on file with the
Columbia Law Review) (describing powers Federal Reserve uses to affect monetary supply).
82. See Francis A. Longstaff, The Flight-to-Liquidity Premium in U.S. Treasury Bond
Prices, 77 J. Bus. 511, 512 (2004) (noting high liquidity of U.S. Treasury bonds).
83. Id. at 525.

1194

COLUMBIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 112:1175

There are, of course, policy and prudential reasons why a government might not wish to embark on a path that will require the creation
of too much money, which is why all debt securities (public and private)
face inflation risk.84 Until now, however, only federal debt securities have
carried no default risk.85 Here, the key term from Section 4 is not “questioned” but rather “validity.” As a technical economic matter, the validity
of the debt securities of the United States is beyond question, unless
Congress arbitrarily prevents the Treasury from doing what is necessary
to honor those debts by imposing a binding debt ceiling.
In short, despite a legitimate range of reasonable disagreement over
the meaning of Section 4, we think it is best read as obligating the federal
government to pay all of its obligations but not limiting federal borrowing. Thus, during an impasse of the sort that was narrowly avoided in
August 2011, Section 4 would require the president to refuse to honor
the debt ceiling if doing so would cause the government to fail to meet
any of its financial obligations in a timely manner. But, as we now
explain, a presidential decision to avoid violating Section 4 of the
Fourteenth Amendment would not necessarily ensure that the president
avoided violating other constitutional obligations.
D. Is the Debt Ceiling Really the Source of the Problem?
Notwithstanding the controversy over the meaning of Section 4 of
the Fourteenth Amendment, there is an independent argument—one
that does not rely upon the Fourteenth Amendment at all—that leads to
the conclusion that a president must violate the debt ceiling in order to
carry out the terms of the annual budget.
In his popular writings about the debt ceiling crisis during the
summer of 2011, Professor Tribe pointed out that the debate might have
been inappropriately focused on the debt ceiling law in isolation, rather
than viewed in the broader context in which the debt ceiling might become binding.86 If we conceive of the annual budget process as creating
two laws—a tax law and a spending law—then it is not the debt ceiling
alone that causes any Fourteenth Amendment problem, but rather the
arithmetic implications of the three laws in combination87: the difference

84. See Suresh Sundaresan, Fixed Income Markets and Their Derivatives 19–20 (3d
ed. 2009) (noting “[m]ost debt securities carry the risk of inflation,” even those indexed to
inflation).
85. See Timothy W. Koch & S. Scott MacDonald, Bank Management 493 (7th ed.
2010) (noting even full faith and credit municipal bonds and securities backed by
Treasuries are still assigned default risk).
86. See Tribe, Debt Ceiling, supra note 74 (highlighting narrow view embraced by
most parties to debt ceiling debate).
87. For simplicity, we refer in the text to three laws, but we have in mind three kinds
of laws, because the levels of spending and taxation are themselves set by the interaction of
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between tax collections and expenditures, relative to any remaining
room for borrowing under the debt ceiling.88
Under this view, even if one accepts our Perry-based argument above
regarding the meaning of “questioning” the validity of the debt, it is
wrong to blame the debt ceiling specifically for any problems that arise
during a budget stalemate. We could, for example, say that the tax law
violates the Constitution, because it fails to collect sufficient revenues to
make an increase in the debt ceiling unnecessary. Similarly, the spending
law brings the validity of the debt into question, by obligating the government to spend more money than it can raise from authorized taxation
and authorized borrowing.
There is, as we discuss further in Part II below, much to this argument. Even so, it is worth considering the unique nature of the debt ceiling law, to determine whether there is anything to the idea that there is a
unique problem with the debt ceiling that would make it—and it alone—
constitutionally problematic.
As noted earlier, the debt ceiling is a relatively recent invention.89
The nation existed for well over a century without a debt ceiling, passing
annual budgets that combined taxes and spending in various amounts.
Although the federal government and its debt were both relatively small
during that time period, the federal debt did exist, and it did fluctuate
over time in response to differences in taxing and spending.
The debt ceiling, therefore, is an appendage that was added to the
system long after the federal government began operating successfully.
To be sure, fiscal conservatives may view the debt ceiling as a very useful
appendage. Each time the debt approaches the debt ceiling, citizens and
politicians who believe that government is too large can use that fact to
impose what they view as fiscal discipline in two ways: First, as in the 2011
impasse, they can demand concessions from their political adversaries as
the price of agreeing to raise the debt ceiling; and second, they can make
their case to the public that the need to raise the debt ceiling reflects
government profligacy. Nevermind that the charge need not be true.
Even if the ratio of debt to GDP shrinks, and even if the government only
runs deficits that are sustainable over the long term, economic growth
will mean that Congress repeatedly runs up against the limit of the
dollar-denominated debt ceiling. The important point is that the debt
ceiling is a visible and useful tool for imposing fiscal austerity—whether
needed or not. And so, for those who believe that fiscal austerity is
needed, the debt ceiling may serve an important function.

the annual budget law, preexisting statutes governing mandatory spending, and all of the
complexities of the Internal Revenue Code.
88. See Tribe, Debt Ceiling, supra note 74 (discussing relation of these three laws
and how, in combination, they create constitutional problem).
89. See supra notes 50–52 and accompanying text.
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But even granting that, the debt ceiling is hardly essential for imposing fiscal austerity. As noted above, fiscal austerity, or any other plausible
policy goal that the debt ceiling might help to accomplish, can be
achieved in the absence of the debt ceiling.90 If Congress and the president think that the debt is too high, then they can combine tax increases
and spending reductions to address that concern.
By contrast, the federal government could not function without
spending laws and tax laws. Those laws must be specific enough to allow
the executive branch to know how to spend money, and from whom to
collect how much in revenues. Allowing the debt ceiling to override one
or both of the tax and spending laws would therefore create a legal
vacuum, leaving the executive branch without guidance from the legislative branch about how to change taxes or spending while maintaining a
level of debt below the ceiling.91
We do not, however, view this argument as essential to our ultimate
conclusion. While there are strong reasons to view the debt ceiling as a
“lesser” law than the tax and spending laws, it is sufficient for our purposes to accept Professor Tribe’s point that there is an interaction
problem among the laws.92 And as we explain in the next Part, the
problem is not simply that the laws conflict, but that they conflict in a way
that gives the president no constitutional options. Once one recognizes
that a president cannot simultaneously carry out all three laws without
violating the Constitution, it is necessary to determine how a president
should decide which law to set aside. With nothing but unconstitutional
choices, what should a president do?
II. THE PRESIDENT’S TRILEMMA: WHICH DUTY MUST HE IGNORE WHEN HE
FACES THREE UNCONSTITUTIONAL CHOICES?
The interaction of the spending law, the tax law, and the debt
ceiling law potentially creates an unsolvable problem. For example, if
Congress were to authorize spending that exceeds tax collections by one
trillion dollars in a year, at a time when the existing federal debt is only
one-half trillion dollars below its statutory ceiling, then the president
could not execute all three laws as written. Faced with that impossible
choice, the president risks acting unconstitutionally no matter what he
might do, because he will have failed to execute at least one duly enacted

90. See supra text accompanying notes 43–46.
91. Congress could specify, in advance, how taxes should be increased or spending
reduced, in the event that the debt ceiling kicks in, through “fallback” provisions in the
relevant statutes. See Michael C. Dorf, Fallback Law, 107 Colum. L. Rev. 303, 304–10
(2007) (discussing policy and constitutional implications of fallback provisions). But
Congress has not done so.
92. See supra notes 86–88 and accompanying text.
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law of the United States.93 He thus faces a “trilemma”: a choice between
three bad options, all of which are unconstitutional.94 While it is also
possible for the president to combine unilateral actions on taxes, spending, and debt—thus potentially violating three separate provisions of the
Constitution simultaneously—we find it more useful to discuss the three
separately. This Part offers constitutional and prudential grounds in support of the conclusion that, faced with the trilemma, the president
should set aside the debt ceiling law. Then Part III draws broader lessons
about the criteria the president and other actors should use for choosing
among unconstitutional options.
A. Three Powers Reserved to Congress
Article I of the Constitution grants to Congress, rather than to the
president, all three powers at play in this debate: taxing, spending, and
borrowing.95 Under Section 8, Congress has “Power To lay and collect
Taxes,” to “borrow Money on the credit of the United States,” and to
“provide for the . . . general Welfare” through the expenditure of
money.96
While there are timeless controversies over the extent of Congress’s
powers under Article I,97 the point here is that any such powers are in
Congress’s hands, not the president’s, at least absent a valid delegation
93. See U.S. Const. art. II, § 3 (stating president shall “take Care that the Laws be
faithfully executed”). As Representative John Vining put it,
What are [the president’s] duties? To see the laws faithfully executed; if he does
not do this effectually, he is responsible. To whom? To the people. Have they the
means of calling him to account, and punishing him for neglect? They have
secured it in the Constitution, by impeachment, to be presented by their
immediate representatives . . . .
Julie R. O’Sullivan, The Interaction Between Impeachment and the Independent Counsel
Statute, 86 Geo. L.J. 2193, 2203 (1998) (quoting 1 Annals of Cong. 594 (1789) (Joseph
Gales ed., 1834) (statement of Rep. John Vining)).
94. As noted in the Introduction, we are aware that there are some plausibly
constitutional methods by which the president could raise money to finance the difference
between spending and taxes. See supra notes 20--22. Selling national parks, selling options
to the Federal Reserve, and similar ideas are innovative and clever, but they strike us as
perfect examples of the type of action most directly implicating at least the spirit of
Section 4 of the Fourteenth Amendment. That is, if the president were seen selling Alaska
back to the Russians, or minting large platinum coins, or anything along those lines, then
any reasonable person would question the validity of the debt of the United States. No
functioning government could engage in such Hail Mary desperation plays without
undermining public confidence in all of its finances, perhaps fatally. As we explain below,
even if such tactics were deemed constitutionally valid, the government should not have to
try them if they would bring about financial ruin. See infra Part III.C.
95. U.S. Const. art. I.
96. Id. art. I, § 8.
97. See Gerard N. Magliocca, A New Approach to Congressional Power: Revisiting
the Legal Tender Cases, 95 Geo. L.J. 119, 120 (2006) (noting question of “the scope of
Congress’s enumerated powers is . . . constitutional law’s oldest debate”).
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by Congress to the president. For a president to choose unilaterally to
collect taxes in a way not authorized by Congress, or to spend money in a
way not authorized by Congress, or to borrow money in amounts not authorized by Congress, violates the separation of powers enshrined in the
Constitution.98
If Congress, either by choice or by default, puts the president in the
position of having to violate his oath of office, how should the president
proceed? The most aggressive approach would be for the president
simply to assume all powers otherwise reserved to Congress, on the
theory that he cannot be expected to obey the contradictory dictates of a
dysfunctional body.
But this framing of the question may be misleading. Congress does
not act alone, and so the president may share responsibility for its dysfunction. Did the president sign the budget bill that put Congress on a
collision course with the debt ceiling? Did he threaten to veto a bill raising the debt ceiling if it contained (or did not contain) some other
provision he disapproved (or insisted upon)? The trilemma occurs as a
result of a systemic failure rather than simply congressional dysfunction.
Moreover, as we elaborate at greater length in Part III, even if the
president bears no substantial responsibility for the trilemma, he should
follow the path that would do the least violence to the constitutional prerogatives of Congress. In other words, the president should engage in the
most minimal course of action possible and do everything practicable to
allow Congress later to undo what he has done, if Congress ultimately
determines that the president’s extraordinary (but necessary) exercise of
power was unwise.
This analysis suggests that Congress itself could provide guidance
regarding its priorities among the three possible courses of action,
explaining or revealing which of the three powers it cares about the least.
Naturally, any such analysis is comparative, because Congress should
rightly be concerned about guarding all of its enumerated powers.
Moreover, these three powers are all highly valued and closely guarded
legislative prerogatives. The question is not which choice is best, but
which is least bad.
Among the three possibilities, the taxing power would seem to be
the most important power reserved to Congress.99 From the founding,
the notion of limited government was, in significant part, a commitment
98. “When the President acts in absence of either a congressional grant or denial of
authority, he can only rely upon his own independent powers,” which do not include
those powers expressly granted by Article I, Section 8, to Congress. Youngstown Sheet &
Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 637 (1952) (Jackson, J., concurring).
99. See, e.g., Tucker v. Ferguson, 89 U.S. (22 Wall.) 527, 575 (1874) (“The taxing
power is vital to the functions of government. It helps to sustain the social compact and to
give it efficacy. It is intended to promote the general welfare. It reaches the interests of
every member of the community.”).
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to a limitation on the power to tax.100 “No taxation without representation” is only the most memorable of the expressions of this idea,
reserving to the people’s representatives the power to collect taxes.101
That power is also the first of Congress’s powers listed in Section 8 of
Article I.102 Certainly, we are unaware of any situation in which a president has attempted to collect taxes without authorization by Congress;
and it is difficult indeed to imagine any Congress acceding to such a
usurpation of its powers.
Regarding the spending power, the picture is a bit more nuanced. In
the early years of the Republic, Congress passed laws that authorized the
president to spend “up to” certain sums of money, and the president was
accordingly able to carry out his constitutional duties while spending
money in amounts not precisely specified by Congress.103
In most areas of the federal budget, however, that practice has long
since ended. Congress now typically specifies precise amounts of money
(or, in the case of so-called entitlement programs, precise formulae to
determine amounts of money) that the president must spend for each
authorized program.104 When Congress appropriates the money necessary to fund those authorized programs, it effectively orders the
president to spend no more and no less than those amounts. It would be
odd, indeed, if a president were to assert that he could choose to, say,
send Medicare beneficiaries (or their medical care providers) less money
than they would be entitled to receive under the relevant statute.
Moreover, we need not speculate about what would happen if a
president were to assert such authority. The impoundment controversy
during the Nixon Administration involved a direct confrontation be100. See Charles Lockhart, American and Swedish Tax Regimes—Cultural and
Structural Roots, 35 Comp. Pol. 379, 385, 391–92 (2003) (explaining United States’ tax
revenues remain low in relation to other industrial countries because of historical “fidelity
to a neo-Lockean conception of limited government” which stems from time of American
Revolution).
101. See, e.g., Grant Dorfman, The Founders’ Legal Case: “No Taxation Without
Representation” Versus Taxation No Tyranny, 44 Hous. L. Rev. 1377, 1378 (2008) (noting
phrase has become “‘mother’s milk’ of American history education”).
102. U.S. Const. art. I., § 8.
103. See Roy E. Brownell II, The Constitutional Status of the President’s
Impoundment of National Security Funds, 12 Seton Hall Const. L.J. 1, 22–30 (2001)
(discussing early laws under which “President Washington was given broad discretion over
appropriations through use of ‘lump-sum’ appropriations” to expend funds or leave funds
unexpended as he saw fit).
104. Cf. W. Cent. Mo. Rural Dev. Corp. v. Donovan, 659 F.2d 199, 202 (D.C. Cir.
1981) (rejecting challenge to presidential deferral of spending of allocated funds on
ground that it was merely temporary, and thus not in contravention of statutory
requirement that funds be spent). For further discussion of direct-spending legislation
and entitlement programs, see Schick, supra note 31, at 57--81 (discussing tactics to reduce
discretionary spending and Clinton’s efforts to thwart cuts in entitlement programs in
1995–1996 budget).
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tween the executive and legislative branches, with Congress objecting to
Nixon’s theory of an “imperial presidency,” in which the president would
have the power to selectively reduce certain spending programs at his
discretion.105
The result was the Impoundment Control Act of 1974, under which
the president may only propose “rescissions” of appropriated spending.106 Congress, however, need not act on such proposals, and the
president’s power to withhold funds ends after forty-five days.107
Congress, therefore, has made a strong statement of principle, affirming
its power under the Constitution to set the exact sums of money to be
spent on each program, not merely the upper limits.
Arguably, moreover, the Impoundment Control Act was unnecessary
to affirm Congress’s powers. While other provisions of that law have
surely helped to create mechanisms for resolving disputes among the
branches, even before Congress acted lower courts invoked the
Constitution in uniformly ruling against President Nixon’s attempts to
impound funds.108 Passage of the Act mooted those cases before they
reached the Supreme Court, but the fundamental idea that the power to
spend implies the power to spend in exact amounts is persuasive and, in
our view, also strongly implied by the Supreme Court’s invalidation of
the Line Item Veto Act in Clinton v. City of New York.109
For the immediate purpose of determining Congress’s priorities,
however, it is the passage of the Impoundment Control Act itself that
provides useful guidance for future controversies. Congress has demon-

105. See Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., The Imperial Presidency 235–40 (Mariner Books
2004) (1973) (describing President Nixon’s use of impoundment as instrument of policy);
Thomas E. Cronin, A Resurgent Congress and the Imperial Presidency, 95 Pol. Sci. Q. 209,
215–16 (1980) (discussing Nixon’s impounding funds to withhold spending from certain
programs and Congress’s adverse reaction to his “extensive policymaking”).
106. Congressional Budget and Impoundment Control Act of 1974, 2 U.S.C. §§ 681–
688 (2006). See also Cronin, supra note 105, at 221 (noting Congress passed Act partly as
means of reasserting its authority over budget).
107. 2 U.S.C. § 683; see Schlesinger, supra note 105, at 477 (describing Congress’s
discretionary power to act on presidential rescission proposals).
108. See Schlesinger, supra note 105, at 397 (discussing history of courts ruling
unanimously against impoundment); see also Pennsylvania v. Lynn, 362 F. Supp. 1363,
1372 (D.D.C. 1973) (“It is not within the discretion of the Executive to refuse to execute
laws passed by Congress but with which the Executive presently disagrees.”), rev’d, 501 F.
2d 848 (D.C. Cir. 1974); Campaign Clean Water, Inc. v. Ruckelshaus, 361 F. Supp. 689,
700 (E.D. Va. 1973) (holding that impoundment of fifty-five percent of funds allocated to
administration of Water Pollution Control Act was “flagrant abuse of executive discretion”
and therefore void).
109. 524 U.S. 417, 449 (1998). Even Justice Scalia, who dissented in Clinton,
acknowledged that President Nixon was mistaken in his assertion of a constitutional power
to impound appropriated funds in the teeth of a congressional command to spend those
funds. Id. at 468 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (citing Train v. City of New York, 420 U.S. 35
(1975)).
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strated—both by passing the Act and by refusing to grant subsequent
presidential rescission requests—that it wishes to guard its power to
spend against presidential encroachment.
Finally, what about Congress’s power to authorize the borrowing of
money? The existence of the debt ceiling law, of course, suggests that
Congress wishes to limit the amount of money that the government can
borrow.110 In practice, however, Congress has generally treated the debt
ceiling as a symbolic measure or, at most, a bargaining chip of relatively
little value; prior to 2011, everyone understood that the debt ceiling
would ultimately be raised. Each time an increase in the debt ceiling has
been resisted, it has been generally understood that the dollar limit of
the debt ceiling was being used opportunistically.111 Even President
Obama, when he served in the Senate, once voted against a debt ceiling
increase, with no indication that he was doing so because of concerns
about the specific limit involved.112 Taking a stand on the national debt
was politically useful, but no one doubted that Congress would ultimately
raise the debt ceiling.
Yet this line of reasoning might suggest the importance of the debt
ceiling in case of a real impasse. That is, if Congress ever actually were to
refuse to raise the debt ceiling, then that would be an unmistakable
(albeit surprising) statement that it cares deeply about the level of debt.
As we argue below, however, it is difficult to reconcile that inference with
Congress’s having passed tax and spending laws that would otherwise
require an increase in the debt.
In any event, we need not stake our argument on the proposition
that Congress does not care about the debt ceiling. Congress’s refusal to
change any of the three laws—which is the situation that gives rise to this
entire analysis—gives us no reason to think that it cares more about its
power to limit borrowing than about its other powers. At most, through a
failure to raise the debt ceiling, Congress could be read to be saying that
it no longer cares less about protecting its borrowing powers.
It is not surprising that reading Congress’s collective mind regarding
these foundational principles is difficult. Each specific power granted to
Congress under the Constitution is important on its own merits. As a
comparative matter, however, it is difficult not to view the debt ceiling as

110. See 31 U.S.C. § 3101 (2006) (establishing public debt limit).
111. See Anita S. Krishnakumar, In Defense of the Debt Limit Statute, 42 Harv. J. on
Legis. 135, 156 (2005) (stating Congress has used “votes on debt limit increase
legislation . . . as a vehicle for passage of budget-reform or other unrelated legislation”).
The debt ceiling law has been treated “as a dangerous ‘weapon’ used by Congress to force
the President to make uncomfortable compromises on issues unrelated to the debt.” Id. at
138, n.18.
112. See 152 Cong. Rec. 3845 (2006) (listing then-Senator Obama as voting “Nay” on
H.R.J. Res. 47, 109th Cong. (2006)).
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the least important manifestation of Congress’s efforts to protect its
prerogatives.
B. Rules of Interpretation, As Applied to the Debt Ceiling Controversy
When legal provisions are in conflict, or in cases of ambiguity, various interpretive doctrines may be available to resolve the issues at stake.
One such tool is the principle of constitutional avoidance. Perhaps the
various acts of Congress can be collectively construed to avoid the
conclusion that the President was obligated to execute some unconstitutional law. Perhaps the budget that Congress enacted in the spring of
2011 impliedly repealed the debt ceiling limit. If so, then the President
would not have faced a trilemma at all. Ignoring the debt ceiling would
have been the right choice because the debt ceiling would no longer
exist.
Yet, as a judicial doctrine, constitutional avoidance only operates to
permit the selection of a “plausible” construction of a statute.113 We see
no reason why constitutional avoidance should be applied any more
broadly by the executive branch.114 The reason why courts will not unduly
strain statutory text to avoid a constitutional question is to preserve
Congress’s primacy in legislation. That primacy is threatened by executive bending of the law no less than by judicial bending. Accordingly, we
think the president must ask the same question that a court would ask to
determine whether constitutional avoidance enables the conclusion that
the budget law impliedly repealed the debt ceiling: is that a plausible
reading of the budget law?
Although we favor repeal of the debt ceiling on policy grounds, we
do not think that Congress’s adoption of a budget in 2011 can plausibly
be read as having impliedly repealed the debt ceiling. If the enactment of
a budget in which spending will eventually exceed revenues by an
amount greater than the room remaining under the debt ceiling acts as a
tacit repeal of the debt ceiling, then the debt ceiling will have been read
to do literally nothing. After all, the debt ceiling only constrains government borrowing in just such circumstances. Accordingly, reading the
budget law to repeal the debt ceiling law would avoid a constitutional
question only by violating the canon of statutory construction that

113. Milavetz, Gallop & Milavetz, P.A. v. United States, 130 S. Ct. 1324, 1333 (2010)
(quoting Clark v. Martinez, 543 U.S. 371, 381 (2005)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
114. Professor Morrison has argued that in some circumstances constitutional
avoidance should not apply at all within the executive branch. See Trevor W. Morrison,
Constitutional Avoidance in the Executive Branch, 106 Colum. L. Rev. 1189, 1239–58
(2006) (pointing to institutional advantages that render statutes relatively unambiguous
for executive branch actors). But we know of no argument for the executive applying the
principle of constitutional avoidance more broadly than courts apply it.
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instructs courts to “disfavor interpretations of statutes that render
115
language superfluous.”
In addition, there is a longstanding canon of statutory construction
disfavoring repeal by implication, absent “clear and manifest” evidence of
legislative intent.116 Yet there is essentially no evidence in the budget act
itself or anywhere else that Congress, in passing the budget, intended to
repeal the debt ceiling. When Congress passed the budget in 2011, it did
so knowing that every other time it had passed a budget that required
borrowing beyond the debt ceiling, further legislation was subsequently
enacted raising the debt ceiling. Against that background, it is not
plausible to conclude that Congress thought—but did not say in the legislation or anywhere else—that this time things were different.
If canons of construction cannot dissolve the trilemma, they may
nonetheless provide the president with guidance about Congress’s priorities—and thus enable him to choose an unconstitutional course that
minimizes the frustration of those priorities. As we now explain, the two
most useful doctrines both point in the same direction, suggesting that
the debt ceiling should give way when it is in conflict with the taxing and
spending provisions of the government’s budget.
The “last in time” rule suggests that Congress’s most recent enactments provide the best guide to its priorities.117 Congress legislates in
light of existing law, and thus it presumably knows when it is passing new
legislation that would make it impossible for the president to meet his
obligations under both the older and newly enacted laws.
In the case of the debt ceiling, Congress in spring 2011 passed a
budget.118 According to all estimates available at the time, that budget
implied that the government would reach its official debt limit in May; all
of the executive branch’s legally permissible delaying tactics (such as
temporarily suspending reinvestment of certain government funds)
would be exhausted by early August, before the end of the fiscal year.119
115. Conn. Nat’l Bank v. Germain, 503 U.S. 249, 253 (1992).
116. See Hui v. Castenada, 130 S. Ct. 1845, 1853 (2010) (citing Hawaii v. Office of
Haw. Affairs, 556 U.S. 163, 175 (2009)).
117. See, e.g., Whitney v. Robertson, 124 U.S. 190, 194 (1888) (noting when two legal
instruments conflict, “the one last in date will control the other”); Boudette v. Barnette,
923 F.2d 754, 757 (9th Cir. 1991) (“When two statutes conflict the general rule is that the
statute last in time prevails as the most recent expression of the legislature’s will.”).
118. See Janet Hook, Congress Puts Haggling Aside to Pass 2011 Budget Bill, Wall St.
J., Apr. 15, 2011, at A5 (describing months of congressional conflicts leading up to passage
of 2011 budget).
119. See James Risen, Debt Ceiling Increase Is Expected, Geithner Says, N.Y. Times,
Apr. 18, 2011, at A14 (“The administration says the legal debt limit, now just over $14
trillion, will be reached [in May]. Many economists have warned that if the ceiling is not
raised, the United States will soon begin to default on its debt, and that could set off an
international financial crisis.”); Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of the Treasury, Treasury: No
Change to August 2 Estimate Regarding Exhaustion of U.S. Borrowing Authority (July 1,
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Yet the budget called for levels of spending and taxes that would require
increases in the debt to levels beyond the statutory limit.120 If the last-intime doctrine has any purchase here, it leads to the conclusion that, if
push came to shove, Congress must not have wanted the President to enforce the debt ceiling as much as it wanted the President to tax and
spend in accordance with the budget. If Congress had cared enough
about the debt ceiling, it had all of the tools necessary to avoid a conflict
that would lead to the President’s trilemma.
Another useful interpretive doctrine states that “the specific dominates the general.”121 This maxim captures the idea that general statutes
adopt policy goals that have some weight, but that drafters of statutes
legislate in more detail when they mean to specify a particular result. If
the general statutes can be carried out without conflicting with other
laws, then they must be followed. If not, however, then Congress’s attention to detail should trump its more general statements.
Of course, the debt ceiling is in one sense very specific. It states a
precise number beyond which the national debt may not rise.122 But the
taxing and spending laws are much more specific than the debt ceiling
statute in that they express congressional will on a host of specific details,
rather than just one aggregate number. For the reasons discussed in Part
II.D below, that specificity should strongly point the president towards
setting aside the debt ceiling when he is faced with the trilemma. To put
the point briefly, the legislative effort inherent in the taxing and spending laws represents such a delicate balancing act that we must presume
that Congress’s intent would be frustrated to a much greater degree by a
president who elevates the blunt instrument of the debt ceiling above
those other, highly nuanced laws, than by a president who subordinates
the debt ceiling to Congress’s decisions about spending and taxes.
But suppose Congress wanted the president to observe a hard debt
ceiling—one that would prevail over budget and tax laws that called for
2011), available at http://www.treasury.gov/press-center/press-releases/Pages/tg1225
.aspx (on file with the Columbia Law Review); Letter from Timothy F. Geithner, Sec’y of the
Treasury, to Harry Reid, Senate Majority Leader (Apr. 4, 2011) (on file with the Columbia
Law Review) (describing tactics available to executive branch in order to delay default).
120. See Mindy R. Levit et al., Cong. Research Serv., R41633, Reaching the Debt
Limit: Background and Potential Effects on Government Operations 12 (2011)
[hereinafter 2011 CRS Report], available at http://fpc.state.gov/documents/organization
/157101.pdf (on file with the Columbia Law Review) (“[T]he federal government will have
to issue an additional $738 billion in debt on net above the current statutory limit to
finance all obligations for the remainder of [fiscal year 2013].”).
121. See, e.g., Thompson v. Calderon, 151 F.3d 918, 929 (9th Cir. 1998) (noting
“more recent and specific statute” controls over general statute); Greene v. United States,
79 F.3d 1348, 1355 (2d Cir. 1996) (“When two statutes are in conflict, that statute which
addresses the matter at issue in specific terms controls over a statute which addresses the
issue in general terms, unless Congress has manifested a contrary aim.”).
122. 31 U.S.C. § 3101 (2006) (stating federal government may not at any time have
outstanding debt obligations exceeding $14,294,000,000,000).
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spending that leaves a shortfall which would otherwise necessitate
borrowing beyond the debt ceiling. Does our application of the canons
of construction render such a choice impossible? Hardly.
If Congress really wanted a hard debt ceiling, it could so specify in
the debt ceiling and/or its budget and tax bills. For example, the debt
ceiling statute might state something like the following:
In the event that any future Act appropriates funds in amounts
that cannot be paid without borrowing beyond the limits of this
debt ceiling, such future Act shall be construed to authorize the
president to decline to spend such sums as he, in his sound discretion, deems appropriate to impound.
That sort of debt ceiling law would work a partial repeal of the
Impoundment Control Act, and if Congress were then to pass a budget
that required borrowing beyond the debt ceiling, the budget would be
construed in light of the debt ceiling law as prioritizing spending cuts.
But in such a scenario, the president would not be cutting spending
because cutting spending would be less unconstitutional than ignoring the
debt ceiling; in such a scenario, cutting spending would not be unconstitutional at all (so long as the particular spending cuts did not violate
Section 4 of the Fourteenth Amendment or some other constitutional
provision). Put differently, Congress can insist on a hard debt ceiling, but
it may have difficulty prospectively insisting on a hard debt ceiling as a
favored unconstitutional option.
C. Practical Issues Raised by Presidential Unilateralism
Beyond Congress’s own indications of its priorities, there are practical questions that arise when considering which of the three powers of
Congress the president might usurp when faced with a trilemma. Examining the ease or difficulty of carrying out one or another option might
offer guidance about the president’s best course of action, thereby
helping to answer the question of which unconstitutional option is least
unconstitutional. We return to the question of why such pragmatic considerations bear on the relative measure of unconstitutionality in Part III.
1. When the President Cuts Spending. — President Obama, along with
many commentators, concluded in the summer of 2011 that he would be
forced to violate the Constitution by spending less than Congress had
authorized and appropriated in the spending law.123 If he had followed
through, how would that have happened?
Those who were worried about the validity of the public debt—
either for constitutional reasons or out of concern that failing to pay the
nation’s creditors could create a financial and economic crisis—

123. Of course, the President did not say that spending less than Congress had
appropriated would violate the Constitution, but the conclusion follows from our earlier
discussion of the impoundment controversy. See supra text accompanying notes 103–109.
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suggested that the president could simply set aside funds to pay those
obligations that he deemed to be the most important.124 So long as the
president did not use the opportunity to exact political retribution, or to
impermissibly target certain groups in a way that would violate equal
protection, this approach would simply entrust to the president the
power to decide who should not be paid.
As it turns out, however, doing so would be surprisingly difficult
under the laws and procedures that usually govern federal spending.
Because tax revenues arrive at the Treasury daily, in varying amounts, the
government’s ability to pay its bills without borrowing will depend on
which bills happen to come due on the days when the government
happens to be collecting sufficient tax revenues.125 A Social Security
check that could not be paid on Tuesday might be payable on
Wednesday. However, even if the Tuesday payment is not made, there
will be other payments that are due on Wednesday. If the amount of tax
revenue coming in during Wednesday would be enough to pay
Wednesday’s bills, but not both Tuesday’s carryovers plus Wednesday’s
bills, then someone will still not be paid.
Under current law, if the government has enough money in the
Treasury on any given day to pay the bills that are then due, it must pay
those bills.126 The debt ceiling does not override that requirement,
because there would be (by assumption) sufficient non-borrowed funds
to cover the day’s required expenditure. If the president tried to argue
that he must prioritize the older unpaid bills over the current bills,
Wednesday’s would-be recipients could reasonably argue that there is no
principle under the law that authorizes the president to set priorities in
that way. Tuesday’s recipients should, under an equally plausible argu124. See, e.g., Tom McClintock, Debt Reduction Means Difficult Decisions; Families
Get What Washington Doesn’t: Live Within Your Means, Wash. Times, July 28, 2011, at B1
(“President Obama has both the legal authority and constitutional obligation to prioritize
payments to prevent a default. The problem is that a lot of other bills would go
unpaid . . . .”); see also 2011 CRS Report, supra note 120, at 13 (discussing different
legislation proposals made by congressmen that would prioritize payment of certain
obligations, such as principal and interest on debt or Social Security benefits, over other
obligations).
125. The Financial Management Service publishes a Daily Treasury Statement that
reports the amount of revenue received by the Treasury, daily withdrawals, and debt
transactions on a given day. See Overview, Daily Treasury Statement, Fin. Mgmt. Serv.,
www.fms.treas.gov/dts/overview.html (on file with the Columbia Law Review) (last updated
Dec. 4, 2009).
126. See Mindy R. Levit et al., Cong. Research Serv., R41633, Reaching the Debt
Limit: Background and Potential Effects on Government Operations 8 (2012) [hereinafter
2012 CRS Report], available at http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R41633.pdf (on file with
the Columbia Law Review) (stating U.S. Treasury is required “to make payments on
obligations as they come due” because it “lacks formal legal authority to establish priorities
to pay obligations”); see also Binyamin Appelbaum, Treasury Prioritizing Payments, N.Y.
Times, July 28, 2011, at B6 (noting Social Security benefits might go unpaid if debt limit is
reached because of requirement that Treasury make payments as they become due).
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ment, be out of luck until there is enough money to pay a particular
day’s recipients plus all unpaid carryover bills. And if such a day never
comes, then there is no reason why the earlier obligations are more binding than the later ones. The short-term timing of these payment streams
is, in most cases, a matter of happenstance.
The analysis could also be affected by the nature of the payments
that are due. In some cases, a day’s or week’s delay is little more than an
annoyance, while in others, justice delayed is truly justice denied. For
example, a person who is owed money by the federal government could
be relying on that money to fund a down payment on a house, where
even a day’s delay can be sufficient to unravel an entire sale—or even a
series of sales, where the seller in one deal expects to use her proceeds to
become the buyer in a related sale. Again, the nearly random timing of
the specific payment obligations, in conjunction with the equally random
timing of tax receipts, suggests that it would be difficult indeed to create
a principled priority system that forces some recipients to wait while
others are paid.
This problem would become even more difficult if the president
were to try to hoard funds from day to day in anticipation of high-priority
obligations that are expected to arise in the near future. For example, if
the president knows that certain interest payments to government bondholders will be due on Friday, and he does not expect there to be
enough money coming in on Friday to cover those payments, he might
refuse to make payments earlier in the week, even when the concurrent
flow of tax revenues would otherwise be sufficient to cover the payments
due on those days. If Treasury is legally required to pay money due when
it is due, so long as there is money on hand, then certainly the disappointed would-be recipients of those payments could bring actions
against the government.127
But, one might ask, wouldn’t the president make these decisions at
the wholesale level? The president could establish a formula of the
following sort: Bondholders and military personnel get paid in full; the
remaining shortfall is then made up by an equal percentage reduction
among all prospective federal payees based on Treasury’s projection of
the size of the shortfall. Such an algorithm would not require Treasury or
the president to decide, at least on a day-by-day basis, whom to pay and
how much to pay them.

127. In order to satisfy the Article III requirements for standing, a plaintiff must have
suffered a “personal injury fairly traceable to the defendant’s allegedly unlawful conduct
and likely to be redressed by the requested relief.” Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 751
(1984). When “the plaintiff is himself an object of the action (or forgone action) at
issue . . . there is ordinarily little question that the action or inaction has caused him
injury, and that a judgment preventing or requiring the action will redress it.” Lujan v.
Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 561–62 (1992). Suits against the government for
funds allegedly unlawfully withheld fall into this uncontroversial category.
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We concede that it is possible to rewrite the laws and procedures to
allow any set of priorities to be met, but the process of doing so requires
more changes to the law and to executive procedures than might at first
be obvious. Moreover, even if the president does not engage in the kinds
of impermissible favoritism that unilateral spending cuts might allow,
assumption of the power to choose among decision procedures greatly
expands the power of the president to make choices that cross the line
into policy decisions—without any legislation that could fairly be construed as a delegation of that power to him. Setting up rules that protect
would-be recipients of certain payments, such as the example in the
previous paragraph, necessarily disfavors others. Congress has delegated
some limited authority to the president to prioritize certain national
defense spending,128 and the president has in turn delegated some of
that authority to federal agencies,129 but those limited delegations merely
underscore the absence of any broader delegation of prioritization
authority to the president. For the president to make such choices without prior congressional authorization is for him to assume significant
legislative power.130
In short, seemingly simple rules like “across-the-board cuts” or
“prioritization of bondholders” turn out, on the ground, to be anything
but simple. Telling the president to pick winners and losers—even if he
does so in a way that seems to employ a “clean” rule, without the
apparent exercise of day-to-day discretion—both confers awesome power
on the president and increases the likelihood of arbitrary harm to
innocent parties.
2. When the President Increases Borrowing. — If the president, instead of
cutting spending, decides to ignore the debt ceiling, how would he proceed? The issuance of government debt is significantly less complicated
than the determination of government spending levels, because debt is a
relatively undifferentiated (and completely monetizable) asset. Whereas
spending cuts can result in something as serious as missed chemotherapy
treatments or as inconsequential as delays in reimbursing a person’s
travel expenses, borrowing money has more predictable and direct consequences. No one is forced to lend money, and the government simply
borrows as much as it needs to cover its appropriated spending, and no
more.131 Other than the details of the maturities of the debt instruments,
the process is straightforward and unremarkable.

128. See Defense Production Act of 1950, Pub. L. No. 84-774, § 101, 64 Stat. 798, 799
(codified as amended at 50 U.S.C. app. § 2071) (granting president authority to allocate
resources and set domestic spending priorities in matters of national defense).
129. See Exec. Order No. 13,603, 77 Fed. Reg. 16,651, 16,652–58 (Mar. 16, 2012).
130. See supra notes 104–109 and accompanying text (describing limitations
Congress placed on president’s ability to change budget allocation).
131. See 2012 CRS Report, supra note 126, at 1–2 (describing drivers of federal
borrowing).
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From an administrative standpoint, therefore, the issuance of debt
poses no difficulties. There are federal employees who regularly go
through the process of issuing new federal debt, using well-established
mechanisms to interact with potential lenders in the financial markets.132
If the president wishes to issue additional debt, even if that debt would
bring the government’s total borrowing level above the current ceiling,
he can easily issue an order to do so. The recipients of that order would
know exactly what to do, without having to make judgment calls, and
without needing to alter any other laws or procedures that are currently
in place.
Consequently, as a practical matter exceeding the debt ceiling is the
essence of simplicity, especially compared to cutting spending. The more
difficult practical question, however, is how the potential lenders to the
United States would react to the offer of new debt securities that appear
to violate the borrowing clause of Article I, Section 8.133 Would such lenders assume that the new debt is still backed by the full faith and credit of
the United States, even though only the president has authorized the
borrowing?
In part, the answer to this question depends upon the degree of
political dysfunction that attends the crisis at hand. If it appears that the
negotiations passed the witching hour by mere bad luck, but that things
will soon return to normal, then it is easy to imagine that the subsequent
legislative compromise will include an after-the-fact guarantee of the
validity of what we will call the “Presidential bonds.” If, however, it
appears that the political crisis will be longer-lasting, then the risk to
lenders is higher, making them likely either to refuse to lend, or to require higher interest payments (thus exacerbating the government’s
long-term borrowing problems).
If the government simply defaults up front, however, one would
expect markets immediately to respond badly, making it more difficult
and expensive to return the government to its status as a preferred
borrower.134 Avoiding default by issuing potentially illegitimate debt
could, on the other hand, lead to the same result.135 The irony, there132. The Bureau of the Public Debt is the agency within the U.S. Department of the
Treasury that issues debt obligations to the public in order to finance government
operations. This agency handles the sale of government securities on the primary and
secondary markets. It also auctions about $4.5 trillion in securities annually. See Bureau of
the Pub. Debt, U.S. Dep’t of the Treasury, Strategic Plan: Fiscal Years 2009–2014, at 8
(2008), available at http://www.publicdebt.treas.gov/whatwedo/bpdstrategicplan0914.pdf (on file with the Columbia Law Review) (describing Bureau’s duties and authority).
133. U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 2.
134. See 2012 CRS Report, supra note 126, at 11–12 (noting default could lead to “a
downgrade of the U.S. credit rating, an increase in federal and private borrowing costs,
damage to the economic recovery, and broader disruptions to the financial system”).
135. The issuance of potentially illegitimate debt could reduce investor confidence in
the federal government’s commitment to meet its obligations. A loss of investor
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fore, is that a president’s attempt to avoid default on government obligations might cause precisely the real-world problem that it is designed to
avoid.
The difference, however, is in degree. A straight default on obligations, especially debt payments, ends any pretense that the government is
a reliable financial player.136 Issuing bonds of uncertain reliability will
almost surely increase borrowing costs, but any such increase can be no
more than the increase that would attend an up-front default.
Moreover, the underlying factors that could make the Presidential
bonds less valuable are factors that would independently have even more
catastrophic effects on the economy as a whole. If, even after failing to
make an eleventh-hour compromise, Congress and the president still
cannot come to an agreement to end the trilemma, then there will be
reason to worry for the future of the nation. Even the regular budget
process, which precedes the possible creation of any trilemmas, would be
so broken that it would no longer permit the proper functioning of the
government.
Accordingly, if the president had good reason to conclude that the
market would demand intolerably high interest rates for Presidential
bonds, then on that basis he might appropriately rule out ignoring the
debt ceiling as the solution to the trilemma. But in such a scenario, it
would be a policy consideration—the sub-junk status of the prospective
Presidential bonds—rather than a constitutional consideration per se,
that would take the issuance of new debt off the table. Conversely, however, if the president had good reason to believe that financial markets
would only demand a tolerable interest premium for the Presidential
bonds, so that issuing them would make financial sense, then our analysis
suggests that this path should be constitutionally preferred because the
key constitutional consideration—how much legislative power the president must usurp in order to carry out the solution—favors issuing new
debt over canceling appropriations.
In addition, the one aspect of issuing debt that is not purely
mechanical is, as noted above, the determination of the maturities of the
debt securities. If the president decides to issue bonds on his own authority, he must decide (as, indeed, he must when issuing bonds under any
circumstance) whether to issue long-term obligations, short-term obligations, or some combination of maturities. While our earlier argument
with regard to unilateral spending cuts warned of the power of executive
confidence could result in much higher interest rates on the potentially illegitimate debt.
See id. at 12 (“If creditors lost this confidence, the federal government’s interest costs
would likely increase substantially and there would likely be broader disruptions to
financial markets.”).
136. Again, at least initially, the lack of confidence would not be based on any
underlying economic reason, but solely because the political system is creating a false crisis
and a wholly unnecessary trilemma for the President. Once the crisis takes hold, of course,
the damage could spread to the real economy.
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discretion, such discretion in the context of debt issuance can work to
the advantage of the nation. If the president determines, for example,
that the financial markets will accept only short-term Presidential bonds,
then he can choose to issue only such bonds. If, on the other hand,
financial leaders were to inform the president that lenders would rather
buy long-term bonds—perhaps on the theory that the budget process will
have been long since healed ten years hence, with ex post commitment
of the full faith and credit of the United States government to the
Presidential bonds (converting them into standard Treasury bonds)—
then the president can act accordingly. We need make no judgment here
about how the president should act. We simply note that the president,
even when executing an extraordinary decision to issue bonds without
congressional authorization, would retain only the type of discretion that
he already possesses in his duties to manage the debt of the United
States. This is far different from a president taking it upon himself to
alter levels of spending.
In short, while unauthorized issuance of debt would hardly be ideal,
and would carry with it risks of financial and economic disruption, it
would be a more rational and administrable process—to say nothing of a
more limited expansion of presidential discretion—than enacting unauthorized spending cuts. For this and other reasons,137 it would thus be a
less unconstitutional138 course than unilateral presidential spending cuts,
because rationality and administrability are not merely practical considerations; they may bear on constitutionality. Other things being equal, a
presidential course of action in an area of congressional primacy is on
firmer constitutional ground where the president can follow Congress’s
priorities, rather than having to fashion his own in order to act coherently.
3. When the President Increases Taxes. — Finally, what are the practical
issues that would arise if the president resolved the trilemma by increasing taxes to levels above those authorized by Congress under the tax law?
Taxes lie somewhere between debt and spending in terms of their
heterogeneity. Asking a government to “borrow money” is a rather unambiguous request (again, other than certain technical matters, especially
the maturity dates of the new debt). Asking it to “collect taxes” necessarily implicates a broader range of questions, covering the tax base (that

137. Wholly apart from considerations of rationality and administrability, ignoring
the debt ceiling would be less unconstitutional than unilateral presidential spending cuts
because the former, but not the latter, would ensure that the government did not violate
Section 4 of the Fourteenth Amendment by failing to meet its legal obligation to pay its
bills. Cf. U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 4. In addition, as we discussed above and elaborate
more fully below, ignoring the debt ceiling best reflects what appear to be Congress’s
priorities. See supra Part II.A.
138. We elaborate more fully on what we mean by degrees of constitutionality in Part
III, infra.
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is, what to tax), the rates of taxation, and the likelihood of tax evasion
and avoidance.
Because of these unknowns, the decision to increase taxes necessarily confers powers upon the president (who, throughout this analysis,
is assumed to be acting without the authority of Congress), with significant policy implications. For example, if the president decided to collect
the necessary funds by increasing estate taxes, that would have quite
different effects than if he authorized an increase in excise taxes.
Even so, increasing taxes appears to raise somewhat fewer issues of
complexity than cutting spending. Collecting more money from people
than they expected to pay might cause hardship, and it might unravel
some transactions that would otherwise take place, but the tax collectors
would not face all of the types of questions that budget cutters would face
in the scenarios described above.
From a purely administrative standpoint, moreover, collecting more
taxes is fully within the capacities of the agencies over which the president exercises authority.139 He could, for example, simply instruct the tax
authority to increase withholding on all regular paychecks, under the
income tax or the Social Security and Medicare taxes. This process is
fully automated, and the president’s authorization would be all that was
needed to collect additional funds. Some refusals to pay might follow,
but because the employers withholding the taxes are not paying those
taxes, the process could be expected to be administratively simple.
Deciding to increase the taxes that are easier to collect is, of course,
a policy choice of its own. The burdens would not be shared equally. This
would be one of many reasons that the president would be sure to face
fierce political resistance to any attempt to increase taxes. The administrative simplicity, however, is a strong argument for increasing taxes,
rather than cutting spending, in the event that the financial markets rule
out the possibility of Presidential bonds.

139. See Elena Kagan, Presidential Administration, 114 Harv. L. Rev. 2245, 2329
(2001) (“Congress’s delegations of power to the President logically coexist with a
presumption that the President has ultimate control over all executive agency decisions.”).
The Internal Revenue Service, which is responsible for collecting taxes, is a bureau of the
Department of the Treasury—an executive department controlled by the president.

2012]

LESSONS OF THE DEBT CEILING STANDOFF

1213

D. Prudential Issues Raised by the President’s Choice
The analysis above set aside many policy issues, focusing instead on
the practical implications of each possible solution to the trilemma. At
least as important, however, are the prudential questions that are raised
by different types of unauthorized presidential actions. Such considerations suggest a different set of tradeoffs, based on the likely effects of a
president’s choice, both in the immediate crisis, and in the precedent
that it would set for the country going forward.
The political branches of government are at their most political (in
both good and bad senses) when taxing and spending are involved.
While Congress has agreed over the years to delegate its authority to coin
and regulate money,140 for example, it has never allowed technocratic
agencies to determine the levels and types of taxes and spending that the
government undertakes. Election campaigns are often fought over issues
of taxes and spending, and any compromises are designed to trade off
important priorities, benefits, and costs.141
When Congress agrees to a spending law, it therefore is making a
statement about the importance of various choices, both absolutely and
relatively. If Congress as a whole determines that there should be a
certain level of social spending versus military spending, for example, it is
almost surely true that each member of Congress would have preferred a
different balance. The ultimate spending bill, therefore, represents in
raw form the political balance of power in any given year.
Similarly, the tradeoffs involved in designing the tax laws are also
deeply political. A senator who would prefer a pure consumption tax
allows the income tax to continue, on the condition that certain types of
saving are exempt from taxes. A believer in low corporate tax rates negotiates a compromise in which she allows somewhat higher rates, on the
condition that the recognition of certain corporate income can be
deferred. The nature and complexity of the political choices is limited
only by the imaginations of the parties to the negotiations.
As the process of determining the budget and appropriations proceeds, putting the taxing and spending decisions together multiplies the
ways in which the result is best viewed as a set of quid pro quos and
140. See Fed. Reserve Sys., Purposes, supra note 81, at 85 (“Each of the twelve
Reserve Banks is authorized by the Federal Reserve Act to issue currency, and the
Department of Treasury is authorized to issue coin.”).
141. See William G. Jacoby, Public Attitudes Toward Government Spending, 38 Am.
J. Pol. Sci. 336, 336 (1994) (noting government spending is “significant policy issue” in
U.S. election campaigns); Susan A. MacManus, Taxing and Spending Politics: A
Generational Perspective, 57 J. Pol. 607, 607 (1995) (“[T]axing and spending issues are
increasingly at the forefront of most elections . . . .”); Gerald F. Seib, Taxes Emerge as
Defining Issue for 2012 Campaign, Capital Journal, Wall St. J. (Sept. 19, 2011, 1:16 PM),
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424053111903374004576580710594126704.html
(on file with the Columbia Law Review) (arguing taxes are important issue in every election,
but will be particularly significant in 2012 election because of nation’s economic distress).
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understandings that each member of Congress expects to be honored.
These tradeoffs and balances fully satisfy no one, of course, but they are
hammered out in the atmosphere of a representative body that is constitutionally empowered to make just such difficult choices.
The debt ceiling could be viewed as merely part of this mixture of
tradeoffs. When Congress passed the 2011 budget in spring 2011,142
perhaps it did so in the full knowledge that what its members were agreeing upon would never be enacted. If that were true, however, it would
suggest that the debt ceiling was being used as a bait-and-switch mechanism, with one side acting in bad faith, never intending to honor the
compromises over taxing and spending to which it had agreed.
In any event, the question posed by the trilemma is not whether the
will of Congress might be frustrated by the president’s choice about how
to proceed. The key issue is which choice least threatens Congress’s higher
priorities. If Congress passes a budget that implies a level of borrowing,
yet it also leaves in place prior legislation that purports to forbid that new
level of borrowing, a president who ignores the debt ceiling will honor
the most recent—and, we would argue, most important—of Congress’s
stated priorities, allowing the absolute and relative magnitudes of taxes
and spending mandated by Congress to be carried out.
The worst that can happen in such a case is that Congress would
need to undo the damage in a future budget. That is, if the president’s
guess is incorrect, and Congress’s highest priority was to prevent the
national debt from exceeding a certain dollar amount, then Congress
has the power to pass budgets in future years with surpluses sufficient to
return to the debt level that it prefers.143 The damage that might be
wrought in the meantime, or by having to live under a more austere
budget in future years than otherwise, is a cost of ignoring Congress’s will
today. The costs of allowing a president to violate the balance of
Congress’s priorities in taxing and spending, however, are much more
difficult to undo because the departure from Congress’s choices could
create a dramatically different status quo, thus calling into play a new set
of political forces. If Congress does not like the choices the president
makes in canceling spending or raising taxes, the new reality may prevent
it from putting people in the position that Congress intended when it
passed its budget.144 That is, while it is straightforward to say, “we hereby

142. See Hook, supra note 118 (describing months of congressional conflicts leading
up to passage of 2011 budget).
143. Indeed, as noted above, Congress can even prospectively couple a “hard” debt
ceiling with a delegation to the president of the power to impound appropriated
spending. See supra text accompanying notes 120–122.
144. In an important article, Professors Eskridge and Ferejohn explained how
judicial and administrative constructions of statutes can change the legal status quo against
which the vector sum of political forces in Congress operates. See generally William N.
Eskridge, Jr. & John Ferejohn, The Article I, Section 7 Game, 80 Geo. L.J. 523 (1992). Our
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decree that the national debt should be reduced back to $X trillion,” and
then to pass legislation and retire outstanding debt to make it so, it is
much more difficult (and, perhaps, impossible in many instances) to
restore the status quo ante for people whose taxes were increased by the
president, or who failed to receive particular benefits under the president’s discretionary spending cuts. (Again, refunding tax payments, or
honoring contractual obligations long after benefits were due, does not
guarantee that people will be restored to the state in which Congress
intended them to be.) Just as legislation can be sticky,145 so too can acts
taken by the president that usurp legislative power.
Finally, the prudential tradeoffs inherent in the trilemma can be
framed as a question of how much power each choice confers on the
president. Or, to put it in partisan political terms, which choice would be
the least worrisome from the standpoint of a member of Congress who is
not from the president’s party? While reasonable people might offer
different answers to that question, giving the president the power with
the least latitude—and that is most easily reversed—strikes us as the
prudent choice, no matter which parties control the various political
bodies. For the foregoing reasons, it seems clear that the president would
minimize his assumption of power by issuing debt rather than rebalancing taxing and spending choices.
E. The Hierarchy of Choices
Our analysis, therefore, is not designed to favor one party or ideology over another. We believe that anyone who values the separation of
powers, and who wishes to protect Congress’s prerogatives under the
Constitution, would be best served in the first instance by making sure
that no president is ever faced with such a choice. If the political system
fails, however, the president can best honor the balances inherent in the
Constitution by ignoring the debt ceiling.
But as we noted above, markets could react so badly to the prospect
of Presidential bonds as to reduce the president’s trilemma to a dilemma:
unilaterally cut spending or raise taxes. Which of these options would be
less unconstitutional? Surprisingly, our hierarchy of choices tentatively
suggests that the president’s second-least-bad choice would be to raise
taxes. In addition to the administrative advantages noted above, raising
taxes rather than cutting spending would not shortchange persons who
are legally entitled to government funds. Thus, raising taxes, like ignoring the debt ceiling, avoids a violation of Section 4 of the Fourteenth

point here is that a presidential decision to cancel spending or impose taxes can be
equally or more disruptive and can preclude a congressional “fix” in much the same way.
145. See Eric A. Posner & Adrian Vermeule, Legislative Entrenchment: A
Reappraisal, 111 Yale L.J. 1665, 1667–69 (2002) (discussing possibility of “entrenching
statutes,” which cannot be changed by subsequent legislation).

1216

COLUMBIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 112:1175

Amendment,146 whereas spending cuts, depending on their size and
apportionment, could violate Section 4 in addition to the separation of
powers.
It is curious that during the summer of 2011 so many commentators
and politicians considered the choice to cut spending as not merely the
least bad choice, but actually as a constitutionally valid choice.147 We, by
contrast, recognize that all of the president’s choices would be unconstitutional and we believe that the worst choice would be for the president
to seek to cut spending below the levels authorized by Congress.
What explains this difference in perspective? Candidly, this Article’s
conclusion about the relative constitutional merits of the president’s unilaterally cutting spending versus raising taxes is substantially less certain
than our conclusion that ignoring the debt ceiling is less bad than either
of the other options. After all, the tax code is filled with deductions and
credits that serve the same economic function as spending,148 and so
increases in taxes, even when easier to administer than cuts in spending,
may implicate the very same sorts of policy tradeoffs. From the perspective of separation of powers, therefore, the two could be seen as equally
unconstitutional.
In addition, there is a palpable sense that unilateral increases in
taxes by the president are unthinkable in a way that unilateral spending
cuts by the president are not.149 We fully acknowledge that, as noted
above, this sense that a president just can’t do that would certainly constrain the president from raising taxes as a matter of politics. Still, it is
not clear that this political constraint is a constitutional constraint.
To be sure, longstanding practice is an important factor in constitutional interpretation, and while there are instances in U.S. history of
presidents spending less money than Congress appropriated,150 there is
146. U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 4.
147. See Binyamin Appelbaum, Debt Ceiling Has Some Give, Until Roof Falls In, N.Y.
Times, May 5, 2011, at A1 (noting Republican plan to prioritize interest payments if debt
limit is reached necessarily requires spending cuts); Carl Hulse, Boehner Outlines
Demands on Debt Limit Fight, N.Y. Times, May 10, 2011, at A16 (reporting Speaker
Boehner demands “trillions of dollars in federal spending cuts in exchange for
[Republican] support of an increase in the federal debt limit”); Jim Demint, More
Spending Is a Threat to America, Politico (Jan. 24, 2011, 4:50 AM), http://www.politico
.com/news/stories/0111/48020.html (on file with the Columbia Law Review) (suggesting
government spending is greater threat to full faith and credit of United States than
increasing debt limit).
148. See Stanley S. Surrey, Tax Incentives as a Device for Implementing Government
Policy: A Comparison with Direct Government Expenditures, 83 Harv. L. Rev. 705, 706–07
(1970) (explaining tax expenditures are similar to direct spending because they promote
governmental aims, and giving examples of tax expenditures found in tax laws).
149. See supra text accompanying notes 40–44; see also MacManus, supra note 141,
at 623 (discussing survey of different age groups showing “all age groups overwhelmingly
prefer spending cuts to tax increases”).
150. See supra notes 45–47 and accompanying text.
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no history of presidents raising taxes. But there is less to this point than
meets the eye, because there is no history of presidents spending less
money than Congress appropriated, when Congress has required that the
appropriated sums be fully spent.151
Thus, we will stick with our tentative conclusion that, if faced with
the dilemma of unconstitutionally raising taxes or unconstitutionally cutting spending, the president would act less unconstitutionally by raising
taxes. We are substantially more confident in our conclusion that he
would act still less unconstitutionally by ignoring the debt ceiling, so long
as the bond markets cooperated sufficiently to convert the dilemma into
a trilemma.
By now, however, readers may be wondering exactly what we mean
when we say that one course of action is more or less unconstitutional than
another. Isn’t constitutionality an on/off condition, like pregnancy? We
hope that the discussion so far shows why the answer is no. In the next
Part, we build on the foregoing analysis to develop a more general
account of degrees of unconstitutionality.
III. BEYOND THE DEBT CEILING: THE GENERAL PROBLEM OF NO
CONSTITUTIONAL OPTIONS
The prior Parts of this Article conceptualized the choice President
Obama nearly faced in the summer of 2011 as a choice among unconstitutional options. We also offered views about how a president ought to
choose among the particular unconstitutional options of unilaterally raising taxes, unilaterally cutting spending, and unilaterally issuing debt.
Readers may disagree with our ordinal rankings. Readers may even disa-

151. We acknowledge that the original understanding also strongly cuts against the
president unilaterally raising taxes. The Framers were no doubt aware of the longstanding
parliamentary condemnation of efforts by English kings to collect taxes without legislative
authorization and disapproved on grounds that can be roughly translated into the
American constitutional context. See Josh Chafetz, Impeachment and Assassination, 95
Minn. L. Rev. 347, 367–83 (2010) (discussing reign of Charles I and how it was seen by
Benjamin Franklin); Tribe, Debt Ceiling, supra note 74 (discussing King John’s promise to
lords, in Magna Carta, that taxation would not occur without “common counsel of our
kingdom,” as well as condemnation, in English Bill of Rights of 1689, of efforts by James II
to tax by royal prerogative). But this fact only provides a further reason why a president’s
efforts to raise taxes unilaterally would be unconstitutional, which we freely admit. The
question is whether it would be more or less unconstitutional than a president’s efforts to
cut spending unilaterally. On that point, the original understanding is at least somewhat
ambivalent, for it also provides grounds for condemning a president’s unilateral spending
cuts. Justice Kennedy’s concurrence in Clinton v. City of New York contains ample citations
to Founding-era documents in sounding its warning of the dangers of permitting the
president to make spending cuts on his own. 524 U.S. 417, 449–53 (1998) (Kennedy, J.,
concurring). Meanwhile, if we ask what contemporary Americans would regard as the
paradigmatic example of executive usurpation, we think they would more likely point to
President Nixon’s behavior during the impoundment crisis (and more broadly) than to
seventeenth-century (or earlier) English history.
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gree with our contention that the only realistic options during the debt
ceiling crisis were all unconstitutional. But we hope that most readers will
agree with us that the general problem warrants further consideration. In
this Part, we analyze the problem in general terms: How should government officials choose among unconstitutional options?
One might think that when faced with no constitutional options, the
president (or some other legal actor) is freed from constitutional constraint, at least when the president (or other legal actor) has not himself
created the circumstances necessitating a fateful choice. For concreteness, suppose that Congress had failed to raise the debt ceiling in the
summer of 2011 and that Congress alone bore responsibility for that failure. President Obama might then have reasoned as follows: Congress has
put me in the untenable position of having to violate the Constitution, so Congress
cannot now be heard to complain if I usurp one, rather than another, of its
powers. While this sentiment is somewhat compelling,152 it is ultimately
wrong, and dangerously so.
The costs of constitutional violations will be borne by the people,
not just Congress, both in a practical sense—because people will be required to forgo payments or pay higher taxes now or in the future—and
in a constitutional sense—because structural constitutional provisions
ultimately serve the people, not the institutions they directly protect.153
Thus, even when Congress has wholly avoidably created a constitutional
trilemma (or other multi-lemma) for the president, he cannot use that
fact as a reason to, in effect, punish the people.
Furthermore, the “all bets are off” line of reasoning has no logical
stopping point. If the necessity of violating the Constitution in some way
empowers the president to violate the Constitution in any way, then a
constitutional multi-lemma gives the president potentially unlimited
power. To stick with the debt ceiling example, he could, in violation of
the constitutional allocation of war-making powers,154 unilaterally order
the armed forces to invade Venezuela or Iran, sell its oil on the world
market, and use the proceeds to make up any shortfall between appropriations and revenues from authorized taxing and borrowing. He could,
in violation of Alaska’s equal suffrage in the Senate (and other constitutional limits),155 sell Alaska back to Russia. And so forth. It is clear from

152. Below, we explain that reasoning of this sort may warrant the conclusion that
the courts generally should treat a political actor’s choice among unconstitutional options
as presenting a nonjusticiable political question. See infra text accompanying note 234.
153. See Bond v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 2355, 2364 (2011) (“States are not the sole
intended beneficiaries of federalism. An individual has a direct interest in objecting to
laws that upset the constitutional balance between the National Government and the
States . . . . Fidelity to principles of federalism is not for the States alone to vindicate.”).
154. U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 11–18.
155. See, e.g., id. art. IV, § 4; id. amend. XVII.
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these and other examples that might be adduced that not all constitutional violations are equivalent.
Once one recognizes that some constitutional violations are worse
than others, however, there arises the difficult question of developing
metrics for comparison. We do not attempt to formulate an algorithm
but we state some general principles. This Part elucidates three criteria to
guide the choice among unconstitutional options: minimize the unconstitutional assumption of power; minimize sub-constitutional harm; and
preserve, to the extent possible, each party’s own ability, and the ability
of other actors, to undo or remedy constitutional violations.
From where do we derive these criteria? Partly they emerge from our
discussion of the debt ceiling crisis and other examples. In addition, they
are implicit in the one episode of American history when a president
admitted the possibility that he might have to choose a course of action
from solely unconstitutional options.
The relevant discussion appears in President Abraham Lincoln’s
address to a special session of Congress in July 1861. In late April,
President Lincoln had ordered the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus
suspended between Washington, D.C., and Philadelphia.156 When that
order was carried out, Chief Justice Taney declared the presidential suspension unconstitutional,157 but the writ he issued was ignored. Speaking
to Congress a little over a month later, President Lincoln argued that his
suspension order was constitutional,158 but before coming to that point
he claimed that even if Congress alone had the power to suspend the
privilege of the writ, an unconstitutional presidential suspension was
nonetheless justified as the least unconstitutional option available. He
asked rhetorically, “are all the laws, but one, to go unexecuted, and the
159
government itself go to pieces, lest that one be violated?”
It is clear from the context that the one “law” that warranted violation in President Lincoln’s hypothetical example was a constitutional
provision: the Suspension Clause. But Lincoln implied that failure to
violate the Suspension Clause would be a greater violation of the

156. Letter from Abraham Lincoln, President, to Winfield Scott, Commanding
General, U.S. Army (Apr. 27, 1861), in 4 The Collected Works of Abraham Lincoln 347,
347 (Roy P. Basler ed., 1953) [hereinafter Collected Works of Lincoln].
157. Ex parte Merryman, 17 F. Cas. 144, 149 (Taney, Circuit Justice, C.C.D. Md.
1861) (No. 9,487).
158. See Abraham Lincoln, President, Message to Congress in Special Session (July 4,
1861) [hereinafter Lincoln, Message to Congress], in Collected Works of Lincoln, supra
note 156, at 421, 430–31 (noting, among other things, Suspension Clause of Article I,
Section 9 does not specify what actor may suspend the privilege of the writ when “in Cases
of Rebellion . . . the public Safety may require it” (quoting U.S. Const. art. 1, § 9, cl. 2)).
159. Id. at 430.
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Constitution, as it would betray the Presidential Oath, which requires
the president to “preserve, protect and defend the Constitution of the
161
United States.”
We do not claim that Lincoln was correct that his Oath required him
to suspend the privilege of the writ in order to save the Union. There
may well have been actions short of unilateral suspension that would
have protected national security as effectively. Moreover, real dangers
lurk in presidential assertions of an unlimited constitutional duty to
preserve national security as a basis for overriding clear constitutional
limits. Accordingly, one can think that Lincoln erroneously concluded
that he faced a genuine conflict between constitutional imperatives.
However, assuming arguendo that he did face such a conflict, his method
of resolving the conflict is instructive.
President Lincoln more or less articulated our three criteria for
choosing among unconstitutional options. First, he contended that
presidential suspension, even if assumed unconstitutional, would be less
unconstitutional than the dissolution of the Union. Second, in invoking
the possibility that “the government itself [might] go to pieces,” Lincoln
was not merely invoking a constitutional harm but the sub-constitutional
harms that would follow from dissolution of the Union, which he
balanced against what he thought would be the substantially smaller
162
harm to liberty from suspension. Third, President Lincoln presented
his resolution of the issue for the possibility of congressional reconsidera163
tion, thus observing the third principle: preservation of the power of
other actors to remedy or undo constitutional violations.
In addition to the doubts we have raised about whether President
Lincoln faced a genuine conflict, reasonable minds can differ over
whether he correctly applied the three principles, just as they can differ
over our proposed application of the same principles to the debt ceiling
case. But we hope that the principles themselves will command broad
assent. After explaining why the problem of having no constitutional
options is less rare than one might think, the balance of this Part elucidates the three principles for addressing that problem.

160. See id. (“[W]ould not the official oath be broken, if the government should be
overthrown, when it was believed that disregarding the single law, would tend to preserve
it?”).
161. U.S. Const. art. II, § 1, cl. 8.
162. See Lincoln, Message to Congress, supra note 158, at 430 (contending privilege
of writ of habeas corpus “relieves more of the guilty, than of the innocent” and would only
be violated by presidential suspension “to a very limited extent”).
163. See id. at 431 (“Whether there shall be any legislation upon the subject, and if
any, what, is submitted entirely to the better judgment of Congress.”).
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A. The Scope of the Problem
There is virtually no legal doctrine governing the choice among unconstitutional options. That absence partly reflects the fact that the
Constitution’s commands are almost entirely negative, forbidding rather
than requiring certain actions. For example, government officials may
not deprive persons of life, liberty or property without due process, but
they generally need not take any affirmative steps to provide persons with
various protections and benefits.164 Accordingly, when faced with the
temptation to act unconstitutionally, government actors can usually satisfy the Constitution by simply doing nothing.
However, government actors sometimes labor under affirmative
duties. Two such duties were at issue in the debt ceiling crisis. The Take
Care Clause imposes one duty. The president’s duty to take care that the
laws are faithfully executed is best understood as an affirmative duty to
execute the law.165 Thus, although justiciability doctrines limit the ability
of private parties to seek court orders to the Administration to carry out
the law,166 the duty exists nonetheless. A president who refused to execute some law would, at a minimum, need to explain to the public (and
perhaps to members of Congress seeking to impeach him) that the law is
either unconstitutional167 or that refusal to execute the law in some set of
circumstances was a valid exercise of prosecutorial discretion.168 Simple

164. See, e.g., Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173, 201 (1991) (“The Government has no
affirmative duty to commit any resources to facilitating abortions . . . .” (internal quotation
marks and citations omitted)); DeShaney v. Winnebago Cnty. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 489 U.S.
189, 195 (1989) (“[N]othing in the language of the Due Process Clause itself requires the
State to protect the life, liberty, and property of its citizens against invasion by private
actors.”).
165. See Cass R. Sunstein, Standing and the Privatization of Public Law, 88 Colum. L.
Rev. 1432, 1471 (1988) (“The ‘take Care’ clause, however, is a duty, not a license. The
clause requires the President to carry out the law as enacted by Congress.”).
166. See Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 568–69 (1992) (opinion of
Scalia, J.) (“‘[S]uits challenging . . . the particular programs agencies establish to carry out
their legal obligations [are] rarely if ever appropriate for federal-court adjudication.’”
(quoting Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 759–60 (1984))).
167. See Presidential Authority to Decline to Execute Unconstitutional Statutes, 18
Op. O.L.C. 199, 201 (1994) (“Where the President believes that an enactment [is
unconstitutional], he has the authority to defend his office and decline to abide by
it . . . .”).
168. See Jack Goldsmith & John F. Manning, The President's Completion Power, 115
Yale L.J. 2280, 2293 (2006) (“[The judiciary is reluctant] to review prosecutorial decisions
[because of] the background constitutional premise that the exercise of such discretion is
‘a special province of the Executive.’” (quoting Reno v. Am.-Arab Anti-Discrimination
Comm., 525 U.S. 471, 489 (1999))).
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nonenforcement would be, prima facie, a breach of constitutional
duty.169
Section 4 of the Fourteenth Amendment indicates another affirmative duty of the president. Suppose that some bonds or other government
bills came due. Suppose further that, under the best interpretation of
Section 4, failure to pay the bondholders and other bill submitters would
call into question the public debt, and thus violate Section 4. That conclusion is a conclusion that Section 4 imposes an affirmative obligation.
Phrased in the passive voice (“shall not be questioned”),170 the provision’s language draws no distinction between acts that would call the
public debt into question and omissions that would do so. Indeed, one
would expect that in the usual course Section 4 would most frequently
apply to omissions (namely, failures to pay).
Nor is the president the only government actor with affirmative
obligations under the Constitution. For example, government officials
have affirmative duties to persons in their custody, such as prisoners.171
Or consider the situation of a trial judge faced with a request by a
criminal defendant to restrict press access to courtroom proceedings in
some way in order to guarantee a fair trial. Doing nothing is not in any
meaningful sense an option. To be sure, the trial judge could order that
the indictment be dismissed on the ground that there is no way to fully
honor both the defendant’s Sixth Amendment rights and the First
Amendment rights of the press. In a sense, that would be doing nothing.
But we think—and as we explain below, the courts think—that this is too
high a price to pay to avoid choosing the lesser constitutional evil.
In light of the fact that government actors will, from time to time,
need to choose among unconstitutional options, how should they make
that choice? We next elaborate three salient principles.
B. Minimize the Unconstitutional Assumption of Power
In our discussion of the practical dimensions of the various horns of
the trilemma in Part II, we noted how a presidential decision to ignore
the debt ceiling would require a smaller exercise of distinctively policy
judgment than would be required by a decision to cut spending or raise
taxes. That factor matters for the comparative constitutional analysis
because of the nature of the underlying violations. Any presidential
decision to tax, borrow, or spend (or not spend) without congressional
169. See Nat’l Treasury Emps. Union v. Nixon, 492 F.2d 587, 604 (D.C. Cir. 1974)
(“Article II, Section 3 . . . does not permit the President to refrain from executing laws
duly enacted by the Congress as those laws are construed by the judiciary.”).
170. U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 4.
171. See Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 833 (1994) (“‘[P]rison officials have a
duty . . . to protect prisoners from violence . . . .’” (quoting Cortes-Quinones v. JiminezNettleship, 842 F.2d 556, 558 (1st Cir. 1988))); Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 102–04
(1976) (holding prison officials have obligation to provide medical care to prisoners).
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authorization violates the principle of separation of powers because the
powers to tax, to borrow, and to spend (or not spend) are all allocated to
Congress, not the president.172 But in so allocating power, the
Constitution also allocates to Congress the power to make the innumerable policy tradeoffs and compromises that go into a budget.173 Indeed,
one could readily say that the Constitution allocates to the most representative branch of the federal government the powers to tax, borrow,
and spend precisely because the exercise of these powers involves inherently political choices.
One might plausibly disagree with our conclusion that the president
assumes more legislative policy power when he unilaterally cuts spending
than when he unilaterally raises taxes. One could even disagree with our
conclusion that the president assumes more legislative policy power
when he unilaterally cuts spending or raises taxes than when he unilaterally issues Presidential bonds. But we hope that no one will disagree with
our underlying view that, other things being equal, as between two ways
of unilaterally exercising legislative power in violation of the
Constitution, the president should choose the course in which he unconstitutionally exercises less legislative power.
In choosing whether to usurp the legislative power to borrow, tax, or
(not) spend, the president apparently faces a choice among roughly
commensurable constitutional violations. Each power is allocated to
Congress, and so the president compares apples to apples in choosing
whether the constitutional balance of power will be more or less upset by
his unilateral exercise of one rather than another power.
Yet the actions in question are not exactly commensurate: One
might think that taxing is somehow more quintessentially a legislative
power than borrowing or spending,174 in which case one might conclude
(contrary to our own tentative conclusion in Part II) that the constitu172. See, e.g., U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 1–2; id. art. I, § 9, cl. 7; 2 Joseph Story,
Commentaries on the Constitution of the United States §§ 903–908, 1051 (Boston,
Hilliard, Gray & Co. 1833) (discussing Congress’s powers to tax, borrow, and spend); see
also Clinton L. Rossiter, Constitutional Dictatorship: Crisis Government in Modern
Democracies 226–27 (1948) (discussing President Lincoln’s unauthorized advancement of
two million dollars of unappropriated funds to three private citizens).
173. See Stephen E. Frantzich & Claude Berube, Congress: Games and Strategies 9
(4th ed. 2010) (discussing importance of persuasion and compromise in congressional
coalition building); James J. Gosling, Economics, Politics, and American Public Policy 64
(2008) (noting Congress’s choices in budgetary process “represent an amalgam of
compromises and accommodations that have presidential initiatives as their starting
point”).
174. See Erwin Chemerinsky, The Conservative Assault on the Constitution 77 (2010)
(“Article I of the Constitution gives Congress the power to tax and spend and this always
has been regarded as a quintessential legislative power.”); The Federalist No. 33, at 159
(Alexander Hamilton) (George W. Carey & James McClellan eds., 2001) (describing
power to tax as “the most important of the authorities proposed to be conferred upon the
Union”).
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tionally worst option would be for the president to unilaterally raise
taxes. Further, depending on which unilateral course the president
chooses, he might violate constitutional provisions beyond separation of
powers. As we discussed in Part II, a presidential decision unilaterally cutting spending would potentially violate Section 4 of the Fourteenth
Amendment as well as separation of powers. Meanwhile, a presidential
decision to unilaterally raise taxes could be said to violate the provision
of Article I requiring that bills raising revenue must originate in the
House of Representatives.175 There is no agreed-upon metric for aggregating and weighing these respective constitutional violations. Indeed,
with the notable exception of President Lincoln’s all-the-laws-but-one
speech, there does not even appear to be any awareness of the potential
problem.
Our analysis proceeds by considering real and imaginary examples.
Suppose first that Congress purported to “solve” the debt ceiling impasse
by raising the debt ceiling by an amount insufficient to cover the existing
shortfall, but that, in violation of the Takings Clause176 and (maybe) the
Bill of Attainder Clause,177 Congress made up the difference by including
in the same bill a measure confiscating the holdings of a small number of
extremely wealthy individuals named in the bill. Could the president sign
the bill on the theory that violating the Takings Clause and (maybe) the
Bill of Attainder Clause would be no worse than usurping legislative
power, as he would have to do under the trilemma if he vetoed the
legislation? Or, conversely, is it categorically worse to violate two
constitutional provisions or doctrines—the Takings Clause and the Bill of
Attainder Clause—than to violate just one—the separation of powers
doctrine? Would the confiscation plan be constitutionally equivalent to
unilateral presidential action cutting spending because each action
involves two distinct constitutional violations?
We would reject the notion that the key question is the number of
constitutional provisions at stake. Perhaps if other things were equal,
then one could say that it is worse to violate n+1 constitutional provisions
than to violate n constitutional provisions. But more broadly, any
measure of comparative constitutional harm should be qualitative, not
quantitative—or at least not merely quantitative.
Next consider an admittedly fanciful example. Suppose a criminal
madman slips undetected into the Oval Office and, holding a loaded gun
to the head of the president, orders him either (1) to instruct FBI agents
to perform a warrantless search of the home of the criminal’s ex-wife and
charge her with possession of obscenity when they find a copy of Lady
Chatterley’s Lover; or (2) to unilaterally declare war on Iran and order a

175. U.S. Const. art. I, § 7, cl. 1.
176. Id. amend. V.
177. Id. art. I, § 9, cl. 3.
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nuclear strike against Tehran. Assuming the president is unwilling to
take a bullet for the Constitution (as the consequence of a refusal to
make a choice),178 we think it fairly clear that the president should
choose option (1). Option (1) is not only less harmful than option (2),
but also less unconstitutional, even though option (1) involves violating
two constitutional provisions (the Fourth and First Amendments),
whereas option (2) only involves violating one (the allocation to
Congress of the power to declare war).179 We recognize, however, that we
have not yet fully unpacked exactly what we mean by “less unconstitutional.” For now, we are relying on what we expect will be broadly shared
intuitions.
Those same shared intuitions also undercut any suggestion that
rights are trumps180 in the sense that one should always prefer violating
some non-rights provision to violating a rights provision. Rights may be
trumps in the sense that they prevail against most utilitarian goals,181 but
they are not trumps in the sense that they always prevail against other
(non-rights) constitutional provisions. Indeed, constitutional doctrine
allows that rights can generally be overridden by laws that are narrowly
tailored to serve compelling interests,182 whereas most non-rights provisions do not appear to permit such overrides. For example, the legislative
veto is not permitted even if it is narrowly tailored to serve a compelling

178. In the next section, we shall have more to say about whether the president or
other government official must always choose a constitutional option, if available, even if
the only constitutional options are catastrophic. For now, readers who think that the
president should simply refuse to choose should imagine a variant on the hypothetical
example in which the madman informs the president that if the president refuses to
choose either option, the madman—who is, among his other talents, an excellent mimic—
will impersonate the president and order both the violation of the rights of the madman’s
ex-wife and the nuclear strike on Tehran. Thus, in this modified example, failure to
choose itself leads to unconstitutional actions.
179. U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 11.
180. See Ronald Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously, at xi–xv, 367 (1977) (describing
political rights as “trumps” that exist when “a collective goal is not a sufficient justification
for denying them what they wish, as individuals, to have or to do, or not a sufficient
justification for imposing some loss or injury upon them”).
181. See Ronald Dworkin, A Matter of Principle 370 (1985) (developing equalitybased theory in which certain “rights should be accepted as trumps over utility, if utility is
accepted . . . as the proper background justification”).
182. For this reason, Professor Schauer has aptly stated that rights are better
understood as shields rather than trumps. See Frederick Schauer, A Comment on the
Structure of Rights, 27 Ga. L. Rev. 415, 429–30 (1993) (arguing rights “protect against
certain low justification . . . efforts to restrict the activities that the rights are rights to, but
do not protect against high justification . . . efforts to restrict those activities”).
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interest,183 whereas a law that abridges freedom of speech or uses a suspect classification would be valid if it had that characteristic.184
That difference suggests that perhaps the opposite presumption
should apply. In other words, perhaps nonderogable constitutional provisions (like the Article I, Section 7 requirements at issue in the line-item
veto case185) should generally prevail over derogable ones (like the rights
to free speech and to equal protection). We think that there may be a
limited sense in which such a presumption in fact makes sense: Complying with separation of powers, federalism, or other non-derogable constitutional limits could, in principle, be the sort of compelling interest that
justifies use of a race-based classification or a content-based regulation of
speech.186
But one must be careful not to run too far with this line of analysis.
Although saving the president’s life certainly counts as a compelling
interest, we do not think it would be accurate to say that it is therefore
constitutionally permissible for the president to order the FBI to charge
the gun-wielding madman’s ex-wife with obscenity for possessing nonobscene materials. First Amendment doctrine is nonderogable on this
particular: It does not utilize the compelling interest test to determine
what qualifies as obscenity.187 Likewise, neither is doctrine under the
Fourth Amendment, the other rights provision in this hypothetical case,
exactly derogable. To be sure, there are exceptions to the warrant
requirement, and some of them—such as the exigent circumstances
exception188—are based on compelling interests, but the doctrine does
not directly ask in particular cases whether to sacrifice the right for the
sake of a compelling interest.189 So the possibility of using existing doctrine under a constitutional right to accommodate a structural constitutional provision will not always be available.

183. See INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 959 (1983) (holding congressional veto
unconstitutional).
184. See, e.g., Hill v. Colorado, 530 U.S. 703, 725–26 (2000) (upholding as
constitutional Colorado criminal statute prohibiting individuals from knowingly
approaching within eight feet of another person near health care facilities without that
person's consent, because it served significant government interests and was narrowly
tailored toward those interests).
185. Clinton v. City of New York, 524 U.S. 417 (1998).
186. Cf. Ricci v. DeStefano, 129 S. Ct. 2658, 2677, 2681 (2009) (stating compliance
with Title VII could be compelling interest justifying presumptively impermissible raceconscious public employment measures).
187. See generally Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 24–25 (1973) (discussing
standard for identifying obscenity); Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 489 (1957)
(same).
188. See, e.g., Kentucky v. King, 131 S. Ct. 1849, 1857–58 (2011) (discussing exigent
circumstances exception to general requirement that warrant be obtained prior to
search).
189. Id. at 1858–60.
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Moreover, even when a right can be overridden by a compelling
interest, the doctrine assumes that overriding the right is necessary to
achieve that compelling interest in some non-fortuitous way.190 Yet the
gun to the head of the president bears the wrong sort of causal relationship to any benefit that would derive from charging the madman’s exwife with obscenity for such a charge to qualify as narrowly tailored to
advancing a compelling interest. We think that in our hypothetical
example, it is more straightforward and more accurate to say that the
madman creates a choice for the president between unconstitutional
options. To characterize one option as valid by virtue of the fact that it
enables the president to avoid the other option is to omit the key step in
the process: deciding which option is worse. We shall return to this characterization issue in Part III.C below.
For now, we want to note the seemingly irreducible mushiness of any
plausible test for degrees of unconstitutionality. It is easier to state what
the test should not be than what it should be. As noted above, the test
should not simply count the number of constitutional violations. Nor do
we think that there can be any all-purpose hierarchy of constitutional
provisions. To use an example to which we shall return below, it may be
tempting to say that the First Amendment is more important than the
Sixth Amendment or vice-versa, but nothing in the constitutional text or
our history provides a basis for either judgment.191 One can imagine circumstances in which the values underlying one provision prevail over
those underlying the other, as well as vice-versa.
To make that last point concrete, suppose that the gun-wielding
madman has different priorities. Suppose that he offers the president the
following choice: (1) send the FBI to the home of a potential whistleblower with instructions to seize and destroy documents exposing highlevel government corruption;192 or (2) approve, and then act upon, a
Justice Department legal memorandum asserting that American support
for Libyan rebels in their resistance against the Gadhafi regime can continue without notification to Congress under the War Powers Act.193 Even

190. See, e.g., Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc., 131 S. Ct. 2653, 2668 (2011) (overturning
Vermont law prohibiting pharmacies and other entities from selling prescriber-identifying
information without prescriber’s consent on grounds that law was not narrowly tailored to
compelling state interests in improved public health and reduced healthcare costs).
191. See Neb. Press Ass’n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539, 561 (1976) (“The authors of the Bill
of Rights did not undertake to assign priorities as between First Amendment and Sixth
Amendment rights, ranking one as superior to the other.”).
192. This scenario is not very different from what President Nixon ordered with
respect to Daniel Ellsberg, except of course that no one was holding a gun to Nixon’s
head at the time. See Egil Krogh, The Break-In That History Forgot, N.Y. Times, June 30,
2007, at A17.
193. Auth. To Use Military Force in Libya, 35 Op. O.L.C. (Apr. 1, 2011) (release at
1), available at http://www.justice.gov/olc/2011/authority-military-use-in-libya.pdf (on file
with the Columbia Law Review) (“We concluded that the President had the constitutional

1228

COLUMBIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 112:1175

assuming that the president believes that option (2) would usurp the wardeclaring power of Congress, he could nonetheless fairly conclude that
option (2) is less unconstitutional than option (1) because the abuse of
power entailed by (1) makes the violations of the Fourth and First
Amendments worse in this case. Comparing this conclusion with the
conclusion we reached with respect to the first set of choices discussed
above in the original gun-wielding madman scenario, we see that the
question whether one unconstitutional option is more or less unconstitutional than another can yield different answers in different circumstances, even when the exact same constitutional provisions are in play.194
Does that mean that the entire enterprise of comparing unconstitutional courses of action is utterly mysterious? Not necessarily. To say that
one cannot devise an all-purpose formula for weighing constitutional
harms against one another is not to say that the enterprise is hopelessly
subjective. We think that the sorts of factors that might be invoked in
particular circumstances will often garner consensus. Indeed, we are
familiar with courts and political actors making the relevant sorts of
judgments, even if we are unaccustomed to thinking of them in the terms
described in this Article.
Consider the choice courts must make in deciding whether to adopt
a proposed narrowing construction of a statute in order to avoid a difficult constitutional question. On the one hand, courts try to construe
statutes so that they are constitutional, because invalidating a statute is a
serious affront to the democratic will as expressed through the legislature.195 On the other hand, courts will not wholly rewrite statutes in order
to avoid difficult constitutional questions, because such rewriting is a
different sort of affront to the democratic will, insofar as it usurps the
legislative function.196 Which affront is worse? The cases do not give a
authority to direct the use of force in Libya . . . . We also advised that prior congressional
approval was not constitutionally required to use military force in the limited operations
under consideration.”). This Article assumes for purposes of this hypothetical example
that the gun-wielding madman threatens the president before the Gadhafi regime has
been displaced.
194. Our examples are purely illustrative. Thus, we invite readers who reach other
conclusions with respect to our scenarios to imagine their own scenarios in which the
answer to the question whether one or another constitutional provision prevails in a
conflict changes based on the context.
195. See, e.g., Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22, 62 (1932) (“When the validity of an act
of the Congress is . . . in question . . . even if a serious doubt of constitutionality is raised, it
is a cardinal principle that this Court will first ascertain whether a construction of the
statute is fairly possible by which the question may be avoided.”).
196. See, e.g., United States v. Stevens, 130 S. Ct. 1577, 1591–92 (2010) (refusing to
rewrite statute “for doing so would constitute a ‘serious invasion of the legislative domain,’
and sharply diminish Congress’ ‘incentive to draft a narrowly tailored law in the first
place.’” (citations omitted) (quoting United States v. Treasury Emps. Union, 513 U.S. 454,
479 n.26 (1995); Osborne v. Ohio, 495 U.S. 103, 121 (1990))); Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S.
844, 884–85 (1997) (“This Court ‘will not rewrite a . . . law to conform it to constitutional
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categorical answer, instead applying context-specific judgment to allow
creative interpretation but not rewriting. While there is no sharp boundary line between those activities, there can be consensus about a great
many cases that fall on one or the other side of the boundary.
We think the same should be true about choices among unconstitutional options. In our discussion of the debt-ceiling crisis in Part II, we
gave context-specific reasons why a presidential decision simply to ignore
the debt ceiling would require the exercise of substantially less legislativestyle policy judgment than the decision of what programs to cut and by
how much or the decision of what taxes to raise and by how much. That
judgment reasonably closely parallels the sort of judgment courts must
make in deciding whether a statute can fairly bear a proposed narrowing
construction. Indeed, if anything, the argument that ignoring the debt
ceiling usurps less legislative power than either cutting spending or raising taxes strikes us as more decisive than common arguments for adopting or rejecting a narrowing construction of a statute challenged as
unconstitutional. More broadly, here, as elsewhere, an admittedly mushy
multifactor test can still yield clear answers in cases far from the margins.
One may also encounter mushiness at the threshold. Many constitutional clauses and tests have fuzzy borders, and so, at least prior to a
definitive resolution of the issue, it will not always be clear whether some
proposed course of action would be unconstitutional. Faced with a
choice between a merely arguably unconstitutional option and a clearly
unconstitutional option, the possibility that the former course might turn
out to be constitutional gives the president (or other actor) a powerful
reason for choosing it over the clearly unconstitutional course. For simplicity, our examples assume a choice among options that are all clearly
unconstitutional, but one could apply the same analysis if one or more
options is merely arguably unconstitutional, placing an appropriate-sized
thumb on the scale in favor of the option that might turn out to be constitutional. For the same reasons we have not attempted to reduce the
comparison between clearly unconstitutional options to an algorithm, we
make no such attempt where one or more options is only arguably unconstitutional.
C. Minimize Sub-Constitutional Harm
Another lesson that emerges from the debt ceiling crisis is that
decisionmakers ought to try to minimize sub-constitutional harm as well
as constitutional harm. Here, “sub-constitutional” harm refers to real
harm—economic hardship or even lost lives—but not necessarily harm
that amounts to a constitutional violation. The difference between the
two madman scenarios sheds light on what we mean. In both instances,
option (2) involved the unconstitutional usurpation by the president of
requirements.’” (omission in original) (quoting Virginia v. Am. Booksellers Ass’n, 484 U.S.
383, 397 (1988))).
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the power of Congress to commit the nation to war. But part of what
made option (2) worse in the first scenario than in the second scenario
was a judgment about consequences: It would be worse to use nuclear
weapons against Iran than to provide air support for Libyan rebels
because the likely consequences of using nuclear weapons against Iran—
the deaths of millions of Iranian civilians and the possibility of nuclear
retaliation against the United States or its allies—would be worse than
the consequences of supporting Libyan rebels—at best displacing a dictator with democracy and at worst a mostly contained civil war.
But in saying that differences between the consequences of unconstitutional options matter, we do not mean that consequences are all that
matters. The president’s decision to ignore the debt ceiling, we have
emphasized, would usurp less legislative power—and would thus be less
unconstitutional—than a president’s decision to decide which spending
programs to cut and by how much or which taxes to raise and by how
much. Ignoring the debt ceiling would continue to be less unconstitutional than either of the other unilateral presidential actions even if it
appeared that, on balance, one of these other options would lead to
somewhat better consequences. Perhaps the damage to the economy
from the government having to pay higher rates of interest on
Presidential bonds could be expected to be greater than the damage to
the economy from the expected loss of confidence that would arise from
unilateral presidential action cutting spending or raising taxes. Even so,
we think that ignoring the debt ceiling would be the less unconstitutional
option—unless the differences in projected consequences were reckoned
in orders of magnitude. Put differently, taking the Constitution seriously—and rejecting the “all bets are off” approach—means giving priority to minimizing constitutional harm, while treating as secondary the
principle that sub-constitutional harm ought to be minimized.
To be sure, giving priority to the avoidance of constitutional harm
does not mean giving it absolute priority. If the consequences of following
what would otherwise be the least unconstitutional of several unconstitutional paths would be truly catastrophic, then we think that government
officials would be justified in choosing a somewhat more unconstitutional option that did not lead to catastrophe. With this caveat, our view
is analogous to what moral philosophers call threshold deontology: One
treats certain rules as impervious to arguments for being overridden by
consequentialist considerations, unless the expected adverse consequences rise above a threshold of moral catastrophe.197 For example, a
197. See, e.g., Larry Alexander, Deontology at the Threshold, 37 San Diego L. Rev.
893, 894 (2000) [hereinafter Alexander, Deontology] (“There are some acts that are
morally wrong despite producing a net positive balance of consequences; but if the
positive balance of consequences becomes sufficiently great . . . then one is morally
permitted, and perhaps required, to engage in those acts that are otherwise morally
prohibited.”); Michael S. Moore, Torture and the Balance of Evils, 23 Isr. L. Rev. 280, 327–
32 (1989) (articulating theory and structure of threshold deontology). In drawing an
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threshold deontologist might say that torture is morally impermissible to
save a life or even ten lives but that it is permissible to save a million
lives.198 Likewise here, a president should not choose to cut spending or
raise taxes rather than ignore the debt ceiling in order to save a few
million dollars in GDP, but he could make that choice to avert a substantial chance of a worldwide depression.
The principle of catastrophe avoidance should also apply even in
circumstances in which the president or some other political actor has
available at least one technically constitutional option. For parallelism we
shall call our view of this question threshold constitutionality. Just as threshold deontologists are deontologists below a threshold of catastrophic
harm, threshold constitutionalists favor compliance with the Constitution
below a threshold of catastrophic harm.
We can illustrate threshold constitutionality by reference to
Professor Balkin’s “jumbo coins” proposal. Recall that Balkin argued
that, even if Congress had failed to raise the debt ceiling, the President
could have avoided acting unconstitutionally if he had instructed the
Treasury Department to mint two one-trillion-dollar platinum coins to be
deposited in the government account with the Federal Reserve, thereby
creating an additional two-trillion dollars for the government to spend
on its obligations.199
We note two objections to the jumbo coins proposal. First, the very
act of minting trillion-dollar coins looks so cartoonish and desperate that
it could undermine faith in the government’s ability to repay its obligations, and for that reason it might be understood as a violation of Section
4 of the Fourteenth Amendment.200 A public that observes the federal
government resorting to exotic gimmicks like minting trillion-dollar
coins has reason to worry that public debt may go unpaid. Second, even
if one takes a narrower view of Section 4—so that nothing short of actual
default on obligations counts as a violation—the jumbo coins proposal
would likely spook the markets, leading lenders to demand a very high
rate of interest.
But is that second factor a legitimate consideration absent constitutional necessity? Suppose that the jumbo coins would not actually violate
analogy to threshold deontology, this Article expresses no position on whether threshold
deontology, straight utilitarianism, straight deontology, or some other moral view (such as
virtue ethics) is generally correct.
198. Compare Alexander, Deontology, supra note 197, at 898–901 (“[T]he most
plausible account of a deontological threshold would consider both the number of
persons at which the interests at stake justify overriding negative duties . . . and the
number of persons at which the interests at stake justify imposing affirmative duties . . . .”),
with Moore, supra note 197, at 314–15 (“The moral answer . . . must be . . . [y]ou cannot
torture or kill the innocent, even to achieve what are admittedly good
consequences . . . .”).
199. Balkin, Ways to Bypass, supra note 22.
200. See supra note 94 and accompanying text.
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Section 4 of the Fourteenth Amendment or any other constitutional
provision. Even if minting the jumbo coins would have terrible consequences, would the president nonetheless be obligated to prefer the
jumbo coin option to one of the unconstitutional options (such as ignoring the debt ceiling, cutting spending, or raising taxes)? Is there some
requirement that a president (or other government official) must
exhaust his constitutional options, no matter how disastrous, before he
may even consider unconstitutional options? More generally, is threshold
constitutionality justified? We think it is, although we also think that most
of our analysis should be relevant to those who disagree.
Disagreement with threshold constitutionality might lead to an absolutist position. No matter how high the cost of compliance, the absolutist
says that government officials simply may not violate the Constitution if
they have any constitutional options. In this view, a nondefeasible constitutional provision or doctrine—like the separation of powers—is just
that: completely nondefeasible.201
For the absolutist, choices among truly unconstitutional options will
rarely arise, because any constitutional option—no matter how outlandish or tragic—will have to be given priority.202 Under this view, the
president must sacrifice his life to the gun-wielding madman rather than
choose one of the two unconstitutional options; he must also choose the
jumbo coins option (or some equally outlandish but constitutionally valid
scheme) if he concludes that it is constitutional, even if doing so would
bring financial ruin that could have been avoided by one of the other
unconstitutional options.
We think that the absolutist position for rejecting threshold constitutionality is unjustified for the same sorts of reasons that have been
advanced in favor of threshold deontology and other pluralist moral
views.203 Where a deontological purist would avoid telling a lie even at the
cost of ending the world, we would not. Averting catastrophe warrants
violating the Constitution.
That is not to deny that there is something to be said for the absolutist view. One might worry that if constitutional provisions are not deemed
201. See Craig R. Ducat, Constitutional Interpretation 76–80 (9th ed. 2009)
(discussing constitutional absolutism and the roles rules and principles play in
determining constitutionality of laws).
202. Just a few years before his “all the laws but one” speech, Abraham Lincoln
appeared to endorse absolutism, albeit in a context that did not involve a threat to the
Union. See Abraham Lincoln, Address at Cooper Institute, New York City (Feb. 27, 1860),
in 3 Collected Works of Lincoln, supra note 156, at 522, 531 (“No one who has sworn to
support the Constitution, can conscientiously vote for what he understands to be an
unconstitutional measure, however expedient he may think it . . . .”).
203. For a useful exposition of moral pluralism within the “virtue ethics” tradition
traceable to Aristotle, see Gregory S. Alexander & Eduardo M. Peñalver, An Introduction
to Property Theory 97–101 (2012) (exploring how moral pluralist theories respond to
problem of value incommensurability).
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inviolable, government officials will attach too little weight to them. The
absolutist stance is suboptimal, in this approach, but less suboptimal than
any approach that rejects absolute prohibitions. To continue the torture
analogy, if the law purports to permit torture but only in the tickingbomb scenario, one might worry that the government will start hearing
204
bombs ticking everywhere. An absolute rule deliberately overshoots the
205
mark to avoid the worse sin of undershooting the mark.
Notwithstanding the foregoing logic, one might conclude—as we do
in the present context—that there are both principled and pragmatic
problems with a deliberately overinclusive absolute prohibition. If one
thinks that catastrophes ought to be averted, then, as a matter of principle, there is something dishonest about pretending that one takes an
absolutist stance. Moreover, as a practical matter, it is hardly clear that
the absolutist prohibition does not lead to overdeterrence. By hypothesis,
threshold constitutionality only permits resort to unconstitutional action
to avert a catastrophe, and so adopting the absolutist position risks bringing about catastrophes. At a minimum, before adopting the absolutist
position, one ought to consider the alternatives.
One alternative would be a version of threshold constitutionality that
incorporates catastrophe avoidance into considerations of constitutionality. In this approach, catastrophe avoidance operates within constitutional
law to treat an otherwise unconstitutional course of action as constitutional so long as it is the least unconstitutional of the possible courses of
action that avoid catastrophic harm.206 In the context of the debt ceiling
crisis one might say something like this: We all thought that the separation
of powers was nondefeasible, but we have now encountered a case that
leads us to conclude otherwise. Thus, the rule that says that the president
may not borrow money (or tax or cut spending) without congressional
authorization should be reformulated to say that the president may not
borrow money (or tax or cut spending) without congressional authorization, unless doing so is necessary to avert a catastrophe. Call this the
conflict suppression version of threshold constitutionality: In this approach,
the Constitution accommodates the need to avoid catastrophes by

204. Worse yet, the government may deliberately aggravate situations in order to
justify the use of torture. See Alexander, Deontology, supra note 197, at 902–04
(describing possibility of intentionally increasing danger in order to reach deontological
threshold).
205. In the torture context, Oren Gross has argued that an absolute prohibition is
optimal because it will lead to just the right amount of torture—almost none. Oren Gross,
Are Torture Warrants Warranted? Pragmatic Absolutism and Official Disobedience, 88
Minn. L. Rev. 1481, 1486–87, 1501–11 (2004).
206. For similar approaches and critiques, see Richard A. Posner, Not a Suicide Pact:
The Constitution in a Time of National Emergency 157–58 (2006) (noting “law of
necessity” should be “understood not as law but as the trumping of law by necessity”);
Benjamin A. Kleinerman, 9/11, the Liberty/Security Balance, and the Separation of
Powers, Crim. Just. Ethics, Winter/Spring 2007, at 59, 62 (reviewing Posner, supra).
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authorizing what might otherwise be constitutional violations. 207 Slogans
like “the Constitution is not a suicide pact” reflect the conflict suppression sentiment.208
Presidents (and other elected officials) should find conflict suppression attractive because it enables them to deny that they are ever deliberately taking actions that violate the Constitution. And indeed, conflict
suppression has deep roots in our constitutional culture—so deep that
courts and political actors virtually never even acknowledge that constitutional duties may conflict.
Consider a case that might have been a counterexample. Nebraska
209
Press Ass’n v. Stuart involved at least the potential for a conflict between
the First Amendment right of the press to report fully on a criminal trial
and the Sixth Amendment right of the defendant to a fair trial untainted
by pretrial publicity. Speaking for the Court in that case, Chief Justice
Burger began by appearing to recognize a textual conflict. He wrote,
“The authors of the Bill of Rights did not undertake to assign priorities as
between First Amendment and Sixth Amendment rights, ranking one as
210
superior to the other.” He then disavowed any judicial power to
211
“assign[] to one [right] priority over the other.” And yet, the Court
resolved the case.
How? By construing the outer bounds of the First and Sixth
Amendments so that neither infringed the other. The Court held that
gag orders may be used to override the First Amendment right to freedom of speech and of the press where doing so is essential to ensuring a
212
fair trial —thus favoring the Sixth Amendment over the First
Amendment if push comes to shove—but the Court also held that in the
particular case there had not been a sufficient showing that muzzling the
213
press was necessary to protect the defendant’s right to a fair trial.
207. See, e.g., Terminiello v. City of Chicago, 337 U.S. 1, 37 (1949) (Jackson, J.,
dissenting) (“There is danger that, if the Court does not temper its doctrinaire logic with a
little practical wisdom, it will convert the constitutional Bill of Rights into a suicide pact.”).
208. Courts and commentators frequently voice this sentiment in the national
security context. See, e.g., Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144, 160 (1963)
(“[W]hile the Constitution protects against invasions of individual rights, it is not a suicide
pact.”); Peter Brandon Bayer, Sacrifice and Sacred Honor: Why the Constitution Is a
“Suicide Pact”, 20 Wm. & Mary Bill Rts. J. 287, 289 (2011) (discussing self-defeating
characteristics of “true constitution”); see also David Corn, The “Suicide Pact” Mystery:
Who Coined the Phrase? Justice Goldberg or Justice Jackson?, Slate (Jan. 4, 2002, 11:04
AM),
http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/politics/2002/01/the_suicide_
pact_mystery.html (on file with the Columbia Law Review) (attributing coining of phrase to
Justice Jackson).
209. 427 U.S. 539 (1976).
210. Id. at 561.
211. Id.
212. Id. at 562, 570.
213. Id. at 567–69.
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Although we agree with the substantive result of Nebraska Press Ass’n,
we regard the Court’s claim to have avoided prioritizing rights as highly
formalistic. The Court said, in substance if not in form, that the fair trial
right is more important than the free press right, at least in a case of
unavoidable conflict. But the Court somehow managed to persuade itself
214
that conflict was avoidable.
What were the alternatives? An absolutist of the sort who would insist
on the Treasury minting jumbo coins at the cost of crashing the global
economy might say that the conflict in Nebraska Press Ass’n was avoidable.
The defendant in that case was accused of murdering six people, but the
Constitution does not require that every murderer be punished. If it were
impossible for the defendant to receive a fair trial while at the same time
honoring the freedom of the press, an absolutist would say that the constitutionally required solution is to simply dismiss the indictment.
The dismissal solution might take as its model the exclusionary rule
in criminal procedure, which bars the admission of evidence obtained in
violation of the Fourth or Fifth Amendment.215 If there is insufficient
other evidence for a jury to find a defendant guilty beyond a reasonable
doubt, then the exclusionary rule effectively requires dismissal of an
indictment.216 If that rule obtains for the Fourth and Fifth Amendments,
the absolutist might ask, why not for the First and Sixth Amendments?
The comparison is suggestive but, we think, ultimately unpersuasive,
as the Supreme Court’s own exclusionary rule jurisprudence indicates. In
the post-Warren Court era, the case law has substantially whittled away at
the exclusionary rule, recognizing numerous exceptions where the

214. Id. at 570. A federal appeals court once announced that the Fifth Amendment
right to due process would conflict with, and should prevail over, the Seventh Amendment
right to a civil jury trial if a case were too complex and technical for laypersons to resolve
as jurors. In re Japanese Elec. Prods. Antitrust Litig., 631 F.2d 1069, 1084–86 (3d Cir.
1980). That court cited Nebraska Press Ass’n for the proposition that when two
constitutional requirements conflict, the court should balance the constitutionally
protected interests to produce an accommodation. Id. at 1084. However, other appeals
courts have rejected the notion that the jury trial right must yield because of complexity.
See, e.g., SRI Int'l v. Matsushita Elec. Corp. of Am., 775 F.2d 1107, 1128–30 (Fed. Cir.
1985) (“Elbowing to one side the Seventh Amendment, and the compelling social and
democratic (much less constitutional) bases for its existence, would be at best an unseemly
judicial exercise.”); In re U.S. Fin. Sec. Litig., 609 F.2d 411, 432 (9th Cir. 1979) (holding
“there is no complexity exception to the Seventh Amendment right to jury trial in civil
cases”).
215. See, e.g., Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U.S. 298, 306–07 (1985) (explaining interplay
between Fifth Amendment, Miranda warnings, and remedy of exclusion for Miranda
violations); Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 649–50 (1961) (holding evidence obtained in
violation of Fourth Amendment may not be used in state criminal prosecutions).
216. See United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 907 n.6 (1984) (discussing studies on
effect of exclusionary rule on disposition of felony arrests).
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Justices have found that application of the rule is not cost-justified.217 We
think that these exceptions show that the exclusionary rule has not been
understood in absolutist terms. Although early cases invoking a judicial
integrity rationale for the exclusionary rule could be understood in absolutist terms, the modern doctrine—which rationalizes the exclusionary
rule as a deterrent to illegal police investigation218—shows the Court
carefully calculating costs and benefits. Put simply, we do not have a
criminal procedure doctrine that instructs courts to exclude unlawfully
obtained evidence even when the results would be catastrophic. We have
more nearly the opposite: a set of doctrines that seek to limit the damage
from strict insistence on the observance of constitutional rights.
Indeed, even those jurists who have resisted the erosion of the exclusionary rule need not be understood as constitutional absolutists. Rather,
it may make more sense to understand their view as one that simply
strikes a different balance from the balance that their tougher-on-crime
colleagues strike.219 For the would-be strict enforcers of the exclusionary
rule, the long-term damage that comes from admitting unlawfully
obtained evidence may seem greater than the harm that comes from
occasionally permitting a guilty defendant to go free.220
If a weighing of costs and benefits underlies the Justices’ avoidance
of absolutism by commonly rejecting the application of the exclusionary
rule as a remedy for acknowledged constitutional violations, no such
open weighing is visible in their efforts to deal with circumstances in
which two rights conflict. The Supreme Court’s discussion of the options
217. See, e.g., Jennifer E. Laurin, Trawling for Herring: Lessons in Doctrinal
Borrowing and Convergence, 111 Colum. L. Rev. 670, 691–94 (2011) (discussing
development of cost-benefit analysis for exclusionary rule and cases in which Supreme
Court has found application of rule not cost-justified); Potter Stewart, The Road to Mapp
v. Ohio and Beyond: The Origins, Development and Future of the Exclusionary Rule in
Search-and-Seizure Cases, 83 Colum. L. Rev. 1365, 1399–1404 (1983) (arguing against
“good faith” exception to exclusionary rule within deterrence framework).
218. See Hudson v. Michigan, 547 U.S. 586, 591–92 (2006) (noting modern
exclusionary rule applies narrowly, only to cases with deterrence value); Peter Arenella,
Rethinking the Functions of Criminal Procedure: The Warren and Burger Courts'
Competing Ideologies, 72 Geo. L.J. 185, 192–93, 236–38 (1983) (“The Court has focused
primarily on whether the future deterrent benefits secured by applying the exclusionary
rule outweigh its present tangible costs to reliable guilt-determination.”); Thomas Y.
Davies, The Supreme Court Giveth and the Supreme Court Taketh Away: The Century of
Fourth Amendment “Search and Seizure” Doctrine, 100 J. Crim. L. & Criminology 933,
990–91, 997–1000, 1006–10 (2010) (tracing Supreme Court’s embrace and affirmance of
deterrence rationale).
219. Cf. Stewart, supra note 217, at 1404 (“I have suggested that the exclusionary rule
is a constitutionally mandated remedy, necessary to enforce the fourth and fourteenth
amendments, and that proposals to modify the rule must preserve an effective remedy.”).
220. See, e.g., John P. Gross, Dangerous Criminals, the Search for the Truth and
Effective Law Enforcement: How the Supreme Court Overestimates the Social Costs of the
Exclusionary Rule, 51 Santa Clara L. Rev. 545, 570–71 (2011) (arguing Supreme Court
overestimates costs of exclusionary rule, including danger from freeing guilty defendants).
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221

on offer in Nebraska Press Ass’n was typical for American jurisprudence
in its failure to recognize interclausal conflict, and in that respect, the
United States is an outlier. In most other constitutional democracies, a
court (or other constitutional interpreter) would view a conflict between
two rights (or any two constitutional provisions) as calling for adjudica222
tion. A court (or other actor) would ask which right should prevail in
the particular circumstances, by giving priority to one or the other right,
by balancing the competing interests at stake, or by some other method
that openly acknowledges the conflict. The following figure illustrates the
difference between conflict suppression of the Nebraska Press Ass’n sort
and European- or Canadian-style conflict resolution.

Conflict Suppression

6th
Am.

1st
Am.

Conflict Acknowledgment

6th
Am.

1st
Am.

In the conflict-suppression approach, the prevailing right (in
Nebraska Press Ass’n, the Sixth Amendment fair trial right) eats into area
that the other right (the First Amendment free press right) would otherwise occupy. By contrast, in the conflict-acknowledgment approach, the
constitutional decisionmaker recognizes that the two rights overlap (as
represented by the shaded area) but then decides that one rather than
the other right prevails in that area of overlap.
The Supreme Court’s interpretation of the religion clauses of the
First Amendment also illustrates American constitutional law’s prefer-

221. See supra notes 209–214 and accompanying text.
222. See Jamal Greene, The Rule of Law as a Law of Standards, 99 Geo. L.J. 1289,
1291 (2011) (“[M]any of the world's most respected constitutional courts, including the
courts of Canada, Germany, Israel, India, and South Africa, in addition to the European
Court of Human Rights and the European Court of Justice, incorporate balancing into
forms of proportionality analysis.”). For a careful exposition of the stages of balancing as
employed in modern rights jurisprudence by one of the world’s most important jurists of
the last quarter century, see generally Aharon Barak, Proportionality: Constitutional
Rights and Their Limitations (2012).
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ence for conflict suppression over conflict acknowledgment. The courts
could say that when a person of faith seeks funding for religious activity or
an exemption from a generally applicable law, her claim presents a
conflict between free exercise and establishment: On the one hand,
denial of the exemption or funding will infringe her religion; on the
other hand, granting the exemption or funding may show favoritism
towards religion in general or her particular religion. Under such a
formulation, courts would be required to resolve the conflict between the
free exercise interests and the establishment interests. But in such cases,
the Supreme Court has gone out of its way to avoid construing the relevant provisions as overlapping. Indeed, the cases recognize a kind of no
man’s land of legislative freedom between the religion Clauses—
permitting “‘room for play in the joints’ between” free exercise and
establishment.223
To be sure, the results of conflict acknowledgment and conflict
suppression may often be the same. Even the processes of reaching those
results may be similar. However, the conflict acknowledgment approach
has the comparative virtue of transparency: Courts (and other actors)
openly admit both that there is a conflict between the constitutional
provisions and that they are favoring one rather than the other
approach.
We do not mean to suggest that conflict acknowledgment is a
perfect model for the choice we seek to understand in this Article,
because we are interested in how to decide among unconstitutional
options. Courts that acknowledge interclausal conflict typically say that
after the balancing is completed, the course of action that vindicates the
winning right (or other provision) is constitutionally permissible (or, in the
case of a multinational human rights treaty such as the European
Convention on Human Rights, permitted by the treaty).224 Nonetheless,
conflict acknowledgment is still a better model for the choice among
unconstitutional options than is conflict suppression because the former
makes the element of choice apparent.
Conflict-acknowledging approaches illustrate what Michael Walzer
has termed the problem of “dirty hands.”225 The core idea is that political
actors and others sometimes face “tragic choices” in which any choice
they make (including the choice to do nothing) will be a choice to do
evil. (The William Styron novel Sophie’s Choice—in which Nazis force a
woman to choose which of her two children to sacrifice in order that the
223. Locke v. Davey, 540 U.S. 712, 718 (2004) (quoting Walz v. Tax Comm’n, 397
U.S. 664, 669 (1970)).
224. See, e.g., I.A. v. Turkey, 2005-VIII Eur. Ct. H.R. 249, 258 (holding Turkish court
that fined author of book offensive to Islam did not violate European Convention on
Human Rights due to “pressing social need”).
225. Michael Walzer, Political Action: The Problem of Dirty Hands, in War and Moral
Responsibility 62 (Marshall Cohen et al. eds., 1974).
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other may be spared—presents a dramatic example in the personal
realm.226) They have reason to choose the least bad option but doing so
remains wrongful.227 In the legal academic literature, Oren Gross has
built on the insights of Walzer and others to develop a set of principles
for the legal system to evaluate extra-constitutional decisionmaking.228
We take no position here on the exact approaches proposed by
Walzer, Gross, or anyone else. Our point in invoking their work is much
more basic: Whether we like it or not, life sometimes presents tragic
choices in which there are no good options, and likewise with the law.
Faced with a constitutional tragic choice, insistence on compliance with
constitutional rules will be futile (if there are truly no permissible
options), catastrophic (if there are technically permissible options that
will lead to a catastrophe but one insists on absolute adherence to such
rules anyway), or question-begging (if one uses a conflict suppression
strategy).
Summarizing the principles that have emerged in this section, we
would emphasize three points: (1) after giving priority to minimizing
constitutional harm, legal actors finding themselves with no constitutional options should attempt to minimize sub-constitutional harm; but
(2) minimizing constitutional harm should not be given absolute priority, so that where sub-constitutional harm exceeds a catastrophic threshold, legal actors may sometimes even be justified in choosing an unconstitutional course over a constitutional one; and (3) in choosing among
unconstitutional options, it is better to acknowledge conflict than to
recategorize constitutional violations in ways that suppress or disguise
conflict.
D. Preserve, to the Extent Possible, the Ability To Undo or Remedy Constitutional
Violations
Our final general principle states that government officials choosing
among unconstitutional options should preserve, to the extent possible,
their own ability and the ability of other actors to undo or remedy constitutional violations. Often the choice among unconstitutional options will
be controversial. Indeed, sometimes it will not even be clear that one or
another proposed course of action really is unconstitutional. Accord-

226. William Styron, Sophie’s Choice (Modern Library 1998) (1979).
227. As Gregory Alexander and Eduardo Peñalver note, people who think that all
normative decisions can be reduced to a single currency (such as aggregate utility) have
difficulty “accounting for the notion that moral choice sometimes involves the need to act
even in the face of irreconcilable conflict among values.” Alexander & Peñalver, supra
note 203, at 99. One could analogize the moral monists that Alexander and Peñalver
critique to those constitutional interpreters who favor suppressing conflict among
constitutional clauses and doctrines.
228. See Oren Gross, Chaos and Rules: Should Responses to Violent Crises Always Be
Constitutional?, 112 Yale L.J. 1011, 1105 (2003) (invoking Walzer and Max Weber).
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ingly, such controversy should weigh in favor of some proposed choice
that is readily reversible.
To the extent that a choice among putatively unconstitutional
options is controversial because of a contest over constitutional meaning,
political actors ought to strive to ensure that their favored option permits
expeditious judicial review. This factor arguably cuts against our own prioritization in the debt ceiling trilemma. Recall that by our lights, the
president’s two worst unconstitutional options were unilaterally cutting
spending and unilaterally raising taxes, while his least bad unconstitutional option was to issue Presidential bonds. Yet cutting spending or
raising taxes would likely lead to justiciable cases, whereas issuing
Presidential bonds might not.
A decision to cut spending would quickly lead to a lawsuit by a
person or entity legally entitled to receive funding absent the cut.229
Likewise, a decision to raise taxes would likely lead to a lawsuit by some
party whose resulting tax liability increased. To be sure, given the AntiInjunction Act, a taxpayer could not seek to enjoin the assessment or
collection of his increased taxes, but once he paid the tax, he could sue
for a refund in the Tax Court, with review in the Article III courts,
including the potential for certiorari review by the Supreme Court to
follow.230 But a lawsuit challenging the president’s decision to issue
Presidential bonds would not necessarily lead to litigation.
Would anyone suffer the sort of concrete and particularized injury
needed to authorize Article III standing as a consequence of the issuance
of Presidential bonds? If the government were to fail to pay interest or
principal to the holder of a Presidential bond, then the bondholder
would clearly suffer injury. But what if the government does not default?
One can imagine litigation that would indirectly raise the question
of the validity of the Presidential bonds. Suppose that state law or the
contractual terms governing some investment fund provide that the fund
may only hold “legal” bonds and securities. Suppose further that the
fund manager adds Presidential bonds to the fund’s portfolio. A state
official or fund beneficiary might then sue the manager of the fund for
violating state law or the contractual terms, and the outcome of the
action would depend on the legality of the underlying Presidential
bonds.231 But it is not obvious that such a dispute would arise quickly

229. Clinton v. City of New York is straightforward precedent. The City of New York
successfully challenged spending cuts that President Clinton made under the Line Item
Veto Act. 524 U.S. 417 (1998).
230. 26 U.S.C. § 7421(a) (2006); cf. Flora v. United States, 357 U.S. 63, 75 (1958)
(discussing settled principle of “pay first and litigate later”).
231. Such a lawsuit might fall within the statutorily authorized original jurisdiction of
the federal courts, see Smith v. Kan. City Title & Trust Co., 255 U.S. 180, 199 (1921)
(upholding statutory federal question jurisdiction where state law restricted investments to
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enough to present the issue of the bonds’ validity for expeditious judicial
resolution.
Are there other mechanisms by which the Presidential bonds’ validity could come before the courts? Perhaps holders of other government
debt (for example, Treasury bonds) might worry that by increasing the
total debt, Presidential bonds make it less likely that they will receive
payment—much in the way that the holder of a first mortgage on a home
might worry that the homeowner’s further indebtedness to new lenders
puts the initial loan at greater risk. Yet as we explained above, the principles of default risk applicable to private parties do not apply to a sovereign lending in its own currency.232 Moreover, the whole point of the
Presidential bonds would be to prevent default on existing obligations,
and so it seems highly speculative to say that the Presidential bonds
increase default risk. In any event, even if the Presidential bonds did
increase default risk somewhat, the increased risk of a default in the
indefinite future might not count as the sort of “imminent” injury that
the Court’s cases require for Article III standing.233 Thus, it appears that
a decision to issue Presidential bonds would be substantially more difficult to challenge in court than a presidential decision to cut spending or
raise taxes.
Does that fact lead us to reassess our priority among the elements of
the trilemma? In a word, no. It is true that judicial reviewability counts
for something, but here the reason why there would be no direct judicial
review of the Presidential bonds is a double-edged sword that is much
sharper on its other edge. If no one has standing to challenge the
Presidential bonds directly, that is because no one is directly injured by
them. In the overall cost-benefit analysis, surely the fact that Presidential
bonds cause no concrete and imminent harm counts mostly in their
favor, not against them.
To be clear, we do not claim that Presidential bonds are necessarily
harmless. Relative to spending cuts and tax increases, Presidential bonds
increase the national debt, which could have adverse long-term consequences. But spending cuts and tax increases also could have adverse
long-term consequences, and, in addition, they cause immediate direct
injuries in a way that Presidential bonds mostly do not. How one nets out
the various short-term and long-term costs and benefits of each possible
course of action is a very complicated question. Our point for now is
simply that the absence of any direct concrete and imminent harm to an

“legal securities only”), but even if not, the issue could reach the United States Supreme
Court in a case filed originally in state court.
232. See supra text accompanying notes 80–83.
233. See Summers v. Earth Island Inst., 555 U.S. 488, 492–95 (2009) (repeatedly
reciting requirement that plaintiff seeking injunctive relief against government must
allege imminent concrete injury).
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identifiable party probably counts in favor of Presidential bonds by an
amount that outweighs the cost in forgone or delayed judicial review.
In any event, judicial review is no panacea. A court could decide a
multi-lemma case in a way that makes clear that one course of action is
preferred. For example, a court might decide that the president has the
unilateral power to cut spending after all. But assuming a case in which
there truly are no (non-catastrophic) constitutional options, a reviewing
court does not face the same decision that a political actor does.
For concreteness, suppose that faced with the trilemma, the president chooses to cut spending and that a canceled beneficiary challenges
the cuts. A reviewing court cannot simply rule that the spending cut was
unconstitutional because, by hypothesis, anything the president might
have done would have been unconstitutional. But as we have unpacked
the president’s trilemma, selecting a course of action requires a delicate
blend of constitutional and policy analysis. We can well imagine that the
best course for the president in resolving the trilemma would be to issue
Presidential bonds but that the courts ought to uphold the president’s
selection of any of the horns of the trilemma as a reasonable exercise of
his discretion. We would therefore sympathize with a holding that a
complaint charging the president (or other political actor) with choosing
the wrong unconstitutional option ought to be nonjusticiable. In this
view, the president does not face a naked policy choice in choosing
among unconstitutional options; the relevant constitutional and policy
guideposts leave him with sufficient discretion to render the matter a
political question.
Whether or not a particular choice among unconstitutional options
would lead to a justiciable case or controversy, political actors ought to
try to take actions that can be undone by other political actors. That is
especially true where—as in the debt ceiling trilemma—the core concern
is separation of powers.234 Because the president, no matter what he
does, will end up stepping on the toes of Congress, he ought to ensure
that Congress can specify which toes it wants stepped on (or conversely,
which toes it most wants to avoid being stepped on).
We argued in Part II that the prior choices of Congress indicate that
it placed a higher priority on having its decisions about taxing and
spending respected than about having the borrowing limit respected.
That conclusion was substantially based on the detailed political tradeoffs
that go into taxing and spending laws, by contrast with the simple selection of a number for the debt ceiling.235 The same factors lead us to
conclude that a presidential decision to spend or tax unilaterally would
be more disruptive of the legal status quo than a decision to issue
234. See Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 382 (1989) (“[C]oncern of
encroachment and aggrandizement . . . has animated our separation-of-powers
jurisprudence . . . .”).
235. See supra text accompanying notes 140–143.
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Presidential bonds, and thus, as a practical matter, substantially more
difficult for Congress to undo. Put most simply, because a presidential
decision to cut spending or raise taxes unilaterally usurps substantially
more legislative power than a decision to issue Presidential bonds, cutting spending or raising taxes will generally be stickier.236 If judicial
review of a presidential decision to cut spending or raise taxes is more
likely to occur than judicial review of the decision to issue Presidential
bonds, effective congressional review of the Presidential bonds is more
likely than effective congressional review of unilateral spending cuts or
tax increases. And where, as in the debt crisis case, the core concern is
separation of powers, preserving the opportunity for effective congressional review strikes us as more important than facilitating judicial
review.
CONCLUSION
The debt ceiling crisis of 2011 nearly presented President Obama
with a trilemma of unconstitutional options. Should he or a future president ever squarely face such a trilemma, he would have no good choices
and certainly no good constitutional choices. But choose the president
must. He should do so in a manner that minimizes the unconstitutional
assumption of power, minimizes sub-constitutional harm, and maximally
preserves the ability of other actors to undo or remedy constitutional violations. In the debt ceiling context, given the balance of constitutional,
practical, and prudential considerations, the least unconstitutional
choice would be for the president to continue to issue debt, in the
amounts authorized by the duly enacted budget of the United States.

236. See supra text accompanying notes 144–145. We acknowledge that there is a
sense in which issuing Presidential bonds would be stickier than either unilaterally raising
taxes or cutting spending. The bonds (if deemed valid) would create a property interest,
which Congress would be constitutionally obligated to respect. Cf. supra text
accompanying note 69. By contrast, taxes raised by the president could be subsequently
cut by Congress and spending cut by the president could be restored by Congress without
violating the Constitution. Thus, when we say that Congress can undo a president’s
unilateral borrowing, we do not mean that Congress could default on outstanding bonds.
We are measuring stickiness in a practical political sense rather than a strictly legal sense.
See Eskridge & Ferejohn, supra note 144, at 528–33 (modeling interactions between
president and Congress as iterative game).

